I'm just not sure how you expect me to take your position seriously and blindly follow it, when your reaction to the information I've presented is to pretend th

I'm just not sure how you expect me to take your position seriously and blindly follow it, when your reaction to the information I've presented is to pretend that there's literally no difference between WebSign/Cyph and something like MEGAChat. I felt that the "HPKP suicide" hack (which is something enabled only by recent Web standards) was a stroke of genius on Cure53's part; in the very least generous interpretation, it obviously still isn't equivalent to the security of a vanilla Web application, which you seem to be suggesting. As far as Mario's statement, while you're correct that it doesn't explicitly compare WebSign with installing a native app, it was made in the context of a threat model that assumed that level of security. This is why the one WebSign bypass exploit they found[1] was flagged as High — in any other Web app it would simply be a given that the server can serve new code. re: browser extensions, what WebSign provides is comparable, except without sacrificing the security benefits of the restricted privilege set of a standard Web context. (i.e. A vuln in Cyph wouldn't put more than just your browser tab at risk.) --- 1: This was immediately fixed, and then the HPKP rotation scheme Cure53 came up with was soon added on top of that fix.