4 ms·

all of them are likely to be able to compromise a messaging application that boots from a web page So this is really the fundamental disagreement. What makes y

by buu700 11y ago

all of them are likely to be able to compromise a messaging application that boots from a web page So this is really the fundamental disagreement. What makes you think that running a WebSigned app in a browser is significantly more exploitable than a native app? The way I see it, the worst thing that can be said about WebSign is that it breaks the chain of trust — i.e. that first download is implicitly trusted without any validation from a root certificate preloaded on the OS, whereas an app installed through a well designed package manager wouldn't have that problem. However, downloading a regular old executable through HTTPS is no different, and I don't see you calling that out in the same way. Beyond that issue, I would argue that the browser sandbox offers a more sophisticated and well vetted layer of protection than you would see in just about any native app framework, which leaves XSS as the primary risk (and Cyph has never had a known XSS bug anyway).

tptacek 11y ago
Zero is the number of software security researchers who would agree with you that a program booted from a web page via content-controlled Javascript code running in a browser tab is as secure as a native application. Beyond that, I'm sorry, I'm just not going to go into further details in an HN thread. I don't think many people here think I'm just making stuff up, but in case you're worried about me saying "I told you so" down the road when someone else publishes, here's a fingerprint: b2b90c80626b1ba036bd87abc0741e1c69d2f6da398018de00b52a3cb9fe2121
- buu700 11y ago
  Sure, "zero", except the researchers who actually audited it and concluded exactly that: http://pastebin.com/HcL5bneg http://pastebin.com/HcL5bneg Every reply you've made here seems to have been either an appeal to your own authority or a claim based on a browsing environment circa 2005. You haven't pointed to a single specific flaw in WebSign's architecture, so I can only assume you won't go into further detail because there is no further detail. This conversation was certainly enlightening (if nothing else, at least on our technical messaging). Thank you for the feedback.
  - tptacek 11y ago
    That's not what that message says, but maybe you could email your auditors and ask if they'd stand by the assertion you're making that native apps aren't safer for cryptography than browser apps. As for the rest of it: I'm sorry you feel that way, but I've reached a point in my message-boarding career where, after many, many years of fighting the good (then marginal then tedious then bad) fight, I'm just not going to litigate this issue anymore. What you're doing is now is a bad idea, and for the sake of your users I think you should port to a browser extension (and, eventually, to a native mobile app) as soon as you possibly can. Maybe you can improve your security before your popularity gets out of hand and avoid the fate Telegram seems to be falling into. When new web standards make browser crypto viable, I'll acknowledge them. Unfortunately, the 10 years since 2005 have made browsers less hospitable to cryptography.
    - eganist 11y ago
      > I think you should port to a browser extension Chrome extensions are HTML5/JS... which wouldn't stand to your own argument. > Unfortunately, the 10 years since 2005 have made browsers less hospitable to cryptography. You're saying IE6 and Firefox 1.0 were better for cryptography than our environment today? We've got effective standards like CSP and CSP2 for restricting code execution client side, SRI for validating resources hosted beyond trust boundaries, HPKP and HSTS for ensuring trust on TLS connections, and we have cooperation between major browser vendors to implement patterns like HSTS preloading and even certificate preloading for certain sites such as Twitter, environment sandboxing introduced as early as 2007, and your assertion is that the browser environment now is less hospitable to cryptography than in 2005? You were right a few comments ago; there's no point debating this any further. I have to do some shoveling anyway.
      - tptacek 11y ago
        No, I'm saying that web standards were more hospitable for crypto. The mic drop at the end of your comment would have been more dramatic had you been replying to a comment addressed to you.
    - 11y ago

by buu700 11y ago

tptacek 11y ago

Zero is the number of software security researchers who would agree with you that a program booted from a web page via content-controlled Javascript code running in a browser tab is as secure as a native application. Beyond that, I'm sorry, I'm just not going to go into further details in an HN thread. I don't think many people here think I'm just making stuff up, but in case you're worried about me saying "I told you so" down the road when someone else publishes, here's a fingerprint: b2b90c80626b1ba036bd87abc0741e1c69d2f6da398018de00b52a3cb9fe2121

buu700 11y ago
Sure, "zero", except the researchers who actually audited it and concluded exactly that: http://pastebin.com/HcL5bneg http://pastebin.com/HcL5bneg Every reply you've made here seems to have been either an appeal to your own authority or a claim based on a browsing environment circa 2005. You haven't pointed to a single specific flaw in WebSign's architecture, so I can only assume you won't go into further detail because there is no further detail. This conversation was certainly enlightening (if nothing else, at least on our technical messaging). Thank you for the feedback.
- tptacek 11y ago
  That's not what that message says, but maybe you could email your auditors and ask if they'd stand by the assertion you're making that native apps aren't safer for cryptography than browser apps. As for the rest of it: I'm sorry you feel that way, but I've reached a point in my message-boarding career where, after many, many years of fighting the good (then marginal then tedious then bad) fight, I'm just not going to litigate this issue anymore. What you're doing is now is a bad idea, and for the sake of your users I think you should port to a browser extension (and, eventually, to a native mobile app) as soon as you possibly can. Maybe you can improve your security before your popularity gets out of hand and avoid the fate Telegram seems to be falling into. When new web standards make browser crypto viable, I'll acknowledge them. Unfortunately, the 10 years since 2005 have made browsers less hospitable to cryptography.
  - eganist 11y ago
    > I think you should port to a browser extension Chrome extensions are HTML5/JS... which wouldn't stand to your own argument. > Unfortunately, the 10 years since 2005 have made browsers less hospitable to cryptography. You're saying IE6 and Firefox 1.0 were better for cryptography than our environment today? We've got effective standards like CSP and CSP2 for restricting code execution client side, SRI for validating resources hosted beyond trust boundaries, HPKP and HSTS for ensuring trust on TLS connections, and we have cooperation between major browser vendors to implement patterns like HSTS preloading and even certificate preloading for certain sites such as Twitter, environment sandboxing introduced as early as 2007, and your assertion is that the browser environment now is less hospitable to cryptography than in 2005? You were right a few comments ago; there's no point debating this any further. I have to do some shoveling anyway.
    - tptacek 11y ago
      No, I'm saying that web standards were more hospitable for crypto. The mic drop at the end of your comment would have been more dramatic had you been replying to a comment addressed to you.
  - 11y ago