5 ms·
Yeah, both examples plus him not backing up his performance assertion showed he was full of crap. Haskell did nearly bulletproof STM that I hear. I've seen othe
by nickpsecurity 11y ago
Yeah, both examples plus him not backing up his performance assertion showed he was full of crap. Haskell did nearly bulletproof STM that I hear. I've seen other examples. Your Erlang example is good on M:N. Microkernel with work in AI planning still using it successfully with ever more efficient algorithms. JeOS performance characteristics of the past suggest unikernels might improve performance over monoliths or plain virtualization. Need real-world data rather than assertions.
He seems to be all talk. He's also more critical of unikernel level security and robustness over well-known issues like POLA while ignoring that his own platform violates both POLA and other rules we've learned about INFOSEC over time. The only proven approaches were separation kernels a la Nizza architecture, capability model at OS or component level, and language-based protection w/ extra care on HW interfaces. He doesn't mention those because they oppose UNIX approach, which he ideologically supports, plus show his product is likely not trustworthy.
This article isn't objective or reliable.
- dmpk2k 11y agoI think Bryan Cantrill is referring to both STM and M:N in the context of high performance applications (aka, the norm for him, since he's a kernel engineer). In that sense, both of them do have problems. Circa 2000, Solaris, Linux, and some (all?) BSDs had M:N threading, and all of them threw it away because there are numerous performance artifacts caused by two schedulers (OS and the M:N) conflicting with each other. Mr. Cantrill was there when this all happened, and even wrote a paper on it: ftp://ftp.cs.brown.edu/pub/techreports/96/cs96-19.pdf This doesn't affect Erlang as much simply because Erlang is really slow. I think of it as a waterline -- the lower the overhead of the language, the more likely you will run into the serious problems that M:N typically inflicts. E.g. priority inversion, and long and unpredictable latencies when the OS swaps out a thread that M:N wanted running. As for Haskell and STM, all I know on the topic is that some pretty damn smart engineers at IBM spent a good while trying to make STM work well, and gave up. See this ACM article: https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=1454466 https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=1454466. Perhaps Haskell managed to pull it off through the language restrictions it allows, but I’d like to see some compelling articles on that by engineers who know a thing or two; just because a language has STM doesn’t mean it does it well. Honestly, I think your comments about M:N and STM are more revealing of your ignorance rather that Cantrill's. While you might disagree with him, there’s sufficient literature to give his stance some legitimacy. Sweepingly calling his stance "full of crap" says a thing or two.
- nickpsecurity 11y ago"I think Bryan Cantrill is referring to both STM and M:N in the context of high performance applications (aka, the norm for him, since he's a kernel engineer). In that sense, both of them do have problems." "Honestly, I think your comments about M:N and STM are more revealing of your ignorance rather that Cantrill's." Probably was. Idk who he is or what he does. I'm aware there were fads to claim the two could solve every problem under the Sun in their category. I'm one of those few that ignore fads to focus on any lessons we can learn from certain tech or research. He made a blanket assertion against at least three technologies in one article with no context. Anyone reading might think the techs don't work well in any context. So, I briefly called that. As evidence, I gave an example of STM that worked. In OS's, it had mixed results unless hardware accelerated and one typically had to protect I/O stuff with locks due to irreversibility. Far as M:N, only found OS use for it in security kernels (eg GEMSOS) to help supress covert, timing channels. Didn't expect him to know that use-case, though, since the cloud products are usually full of covert channels. And then there's MirageOS on unikernel end using type- and memory-safety for robust, network applications already showing fewer 0-days than alternatives did. So, all three already have real-world, beneficial use. Quite the opposite of his claim that leads one to believe that never happens. "Sweepingly calling his stance "full of crap" says a thing or two." In other comments, I did present data and specific examples to reject his claims about UNIX being a usable foundation for this sort of thing among others. His approach to such things was to ignore all counter evidence and/or leave the discussion. Eventually, a new article shows him making an adverti... err, a bunch of claims, some backed up and some assertions, about all kinds of tech in an anti-unikernel rant. Strange that you're fine with him ignoring his critic's counterpoints... with references... to his major claims but have trouble with how I handle minor, tangential ones. Says a thing or two indeed.