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This is hardly the first SSL certificate authority to be under the thumb of a nation-state actor, but maybe people will listen this time: Don't trust SSL unless
by cperciva 17y ago
This is hardly the first SSL certificate authority to be under the thumb of a nation-state actor, but maybe people will listen this time: Don't trust SSL unless you can't avoid it.
- mbreese 17y agoAlthough, how many of those are root CAs in Firefox? I'm more than a little leery about this, but at least if there is a security breach due to this, it should be traceable, right? I mean, if a CA signs a faulty certificate, their signature is part of the certificate, so it should be traceable. So, without any evidence of wrongdoing, how are they any worse than Verisign? Or any of the cheap SSL certificate providers? It's not like the CNNIC is going out of business anytime soon.
- cperciva 17y agoThere will be documentary evidence if a nation-state actor uses a bogus SSL certificate, yes. Whether anyone will keep said evidence -- do you keep long-term copies of every SSL certificate you see for www.google.com? -- is a different matter, especially since a smart attacker (which we presume nation-state actors are) is likely to be selective in their targets.
- __david__ 17y agoIt would be nice if Firefox kept track of certs and notified you of changes (like ssh) regardless of them being signed by a CA or not. Especially if servers made their certs continuous (ie, signing the new one with the old one), in which case it would only warn on discontinuous cert changes.
- insulanus 17y agoYes, this tool should be on by default: https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/6415 https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/6415
- mtomczak 17y agoInteresting point. But if we aren't going to trust SSL, what should we trust for commerce over the Internet?