4 ms·
It's even more unfortunate that the committees designing these protocols don't think this way. People with an identifier number tattooed on their arm don't walk
by mindslight 11y ago
It's even more unfortunate that the committees designing these protocols don't think this way. People with an identifier number tattooed on their arm don't walk around continually reciting it. In fact, they generally wear long sleeves.
- mikeash 11y agoThat's the most unexpected and off-the-wall Godwin I've ever seen.
- mindslight 11y agoDoes being able to draw a parallel affect the validity of the point? Or is your memetic immune system misleading you? FWIW despite what our modern religion emphasizes, the Nazis were hardly the only ones to track prisoners with tattooed numbers
- mikeash 11y agoThe comparison between willingly assigned and transmitted MAC addresses and death camp tattoos is utterly absurd, both because it unnecessarily pulls Nazis into the conversation, and because they have no useful parallels purely from a technical point of view.
- mindslight 11y agoCalling them "willingly" transmitted is a bit of a stretch, given that people don't have much choice to turn just them off and defaults are a powerful thing. The useful parallel is the general inventorying and tracking of people. Luckily we don't have the rest of totalitarianism (yet), but this cornerstone is well laid due to naive designers. BTW you were the one who brought up the subject of Nazis.
- mikeash 11y agoRight, when you said "People with an identifier number tattooed on their arm" you weren't even thinking of Nazi concentration camp victims. Sure. Pull the other one. Every router I've ever seen has a pretty clear setup option for creating a hidden network. I agree that defaults are powerful, but they don't make it any less "willing," they merely expose people's indifference.
- mindslight 11y agoActually I was thinking of prisoners of the Japanese in WWII. As I said, the Nazis were hardly the only ones to number prisoners, and I suspect the phenomenon has more to do with technology than with the supreme evil tidily ascribed to losers of wars. I'm making a general point about identifiers and protocols. The same thing applies to client MACs, which are obviously being used to track phone users with wifi on. Obviously MAC addresses can be cycled, but that takes active diligence. If the protocol had simply been designed to eschew and hide such identifiers in the first place, the entire issue wouldn't even exist.
- simoncion 11y ago> Actually I was thinking of prisoners of the Japanese in WWII. I've never heard of this, and have family that served in the Pacific during WWII. I'm also having difficulty discovering any sources that mention the practice, let alone reliable ones.
- mindslight 11y agoMaybe I have my family history wrong? I certainly see plenty of references to "POW number" for various conflicts.
- simoncion 11y ago> I certainly see plenty of references to "POW number" for various conflicts. AFAIK, it was never policy of the Allied forces to tattoo anything on captured POWs. I would be very surprised if captured Axis soldiers were not given some sort of uniform, unique tracking number.
- simoncion 11y ago> It's even more unfortunate that the committees designing these protocols don't think this way. So. How would you design a system to permit associated or unassociated stations to passively determine whether or not they were in range of a given AP? Remember that unassociated stations may never have ever interacted with the AP in question before this moment.
- mindslight 11y agoThat's the easy part. If previous contact hasn't taken place, persistence is irrelevant. Simply envision the current system with a periodically changing BSSID as your proof of existence. If the AP and client possess a shared secret (as in WPA2), then there's no reason for a third party to be able to deduce any identifying information.
- simoncion 11y ago> That's the easy part. If previous contact hasn't taken place, persistence is irrelevant. A periodically-changing ID would do. Okay. How would you design a system to permit associated or unassociated stations to passively determine whether or not they were in range of a given AP? Remember that human-friendly names for a given AP are almost certain to collide.
- mindslight 11y agoFirst, for purposes of this comment I only need to address the situation where WPA2 is currently used (the majority of private APs). Second, I'm one person taking a few minutes to write a HN comment, not a design committee. Simple protocol: The AP and client have shared secret K (similar to the present WPA2 key). We define the identity of a network as this secret key. The AP can change "BSSID" every hour, while broadcasting [BSSID, Hash(BSSID, K)]. An interested client runs through their database of known private networks, checking if the broadcaster is any they know. This obviously has a number of shortcomings (eg our attacker is also known to groom people into uploading K to their silos), but it should illustrate the concept.