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> If they are willing to remove encryption features to please totalitarian states, what backdoors are they also willing to include? That's a rather uncharitabl
by SEMW 11y ago
> If they are willing to remove encryption features to please totalitarian states, what backdoors are they also willing to include?
That's a rather uncharitable interpretation. If a state was ordering them to include a backdoor in the next release, their options boil down to either 'include a backdoor' or 'shut down the service'[0]. Implying that a service that chooses the latter is more likely to also include a backdoor doesn't seem justified.
[0] (or 'have the resources for a massive secret legal battle', which may not even be possible depending on the nation state and nature of the order).
- sheepdestroyer 11y agoThey may very well be prevented to explicitly name the what and who, but then it essentially becomes a trust issue. If there is now one less security feature to please anonymous (for now) states, how to trust them not including other "features" on their requests? Uncharitable, and a tad paranoiac, as it may be...
- SEMW 11y agoYour trust model doesn't make sense to me. A trust heuristic that penalises even the least worst public action they could take on being served with a backdooring+gag order -- i.e. shutting down the service to avoid complying -- is effectively rewarding services that take no public action at all, ie silently comply. Such a heuristic isn't paranoid -- if anything, it's rather credulous (by applying comparatively less scrutiny to services which operate out of the same jurisdiction (one known to serve orders of this type) yet which somehow happily continue operating).
- sheepdestroyer 11y agoIt only makes sense on this specific case as something slipped through. So now, without more (possibly unobtainable) details we are left wondering. In general, we are in desperate need of an effective Warrant Canary system. Being able to trust is important and difficult.