29 ms·
I'm not "arguing for the sake of arguing." I'm trying to explain my point to you, and I'm doing so in a polite manner, which is exactly what I'd expect from you
by sordidarray 17y ago
I'm not "arguing for the sake of arguing." I'm trying to explain my point to you, and I'm doing so in a polite manner, which is exactly what I'd expect from you.
The weaknesses in SHA-1 make it a poor cryptographic hash, which make it a poor pseudorandom function, which has a significant potential to make it a poor password hash.
My point, for the second time, is that you're not "effed" if you use salted hashes.
I'm not trying to "prove" anything. I'm stating my opinion on the matter. This isn't a pissing contest, rather, a forum for discussion.
- tptacek 17y agoI'd like you to explain how you'd exploit a problem with SHA-1, or, to make it more interesting, MD5 or MD4, to attack a "typical" hashed password (say, Keychain.app "memorable") more quickly than via iterated brute force.
- sordidarray 17y agoCurrently such attacks are infeasible, but there are some very interesting, and very promising families of collision-based attacks (such as herding) which may yield results in that area, although such attacks may only work in specific cases.
- dfranke 17y agoAll public results against SHA-1 are collision attacks. Password hashing doesn't rely on collision-resistance, only one-wayness. Not even MD5 has any published preimage attacks against it. The known weaknesses in these functions have nothing to do with why they're poor choices for password storage.