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>Generate a bunch of (optionally multisig) addresses. Print the private keys. Copy the addresses to your server that processes transactions. Lock away the priva
by forgetsusername 11y ago
>Generate a bunch of (optionally multisig) addresses. Print the private keys. Copy the addresses to your server that processes transactions. Lock away the private keys (optionally in multiple places). Never connect the offline computer or printer to the internet.
Only for millions of coins? What about the savings of the average person? A loss would be devastating. Do you recommend the same security measures? If the system is insecure, it's insecure.
The idea that Bitcoin is in any way ready for the mainstream is kind of funny.
- eterpstra 11y agoCash and debit cards are pretty funny, too. Anyone who grabs your cash, or gets away with a purchase on your debit card is laughing pretty hard at your expense. Maybe, if you're lucky, your bank will get around to reversing the fraudulent debit card charges, but the thief still gets away. There is nothing secure about any money system.
- sirsar 11y agoI do this, minus the "dedicated computer and printer" part. Pretty simple, really. Another option is dedicated smartcards that hold the keys. I'm genuinely curious. Can you envision any possible distributed internet currency that wouldn't require human interaction for the highest level of security? Keep in mind, the threat model here is someone gaining read access to a few kb of data. With an automated, internet-facing system, I see an airgap as the only reasonable defense against that threat. If someone gains read access to, say, your bank session cookies, they could also feasibly clean you out. The only difference is the bank might be able to reverse the transaction (undesirable a decentralized currency) or cover your losses (not a bad idea).
- ryanlol 11y agoIf you're holding your savings in cash you're doing it wrong.