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People need to realize that DRM is simply a tool. Absent pernicious laws like the DMCA, forms of DRM are like fences, locks, and cameras. Such tools can be used
by stcredzero 11y ago
People need to realize that DRM is simply a tool. Absent pernicious laws like the DMCA, forms of DRM are like fences, locks, and cameras. Such tools can be used to oppress people. The same tools could also be used to protect individual's privacy and act as a check on what organizations can do with people's data.
Those who control products and infrastructure shouldn't be allowed to set up such tools to grant themselves disproportionate power. However, individuals need to realize that such tools could help protect them as well. (Analogy: Camera phones and police misconduct.)
- mikeash 11y agoWhat would favorable DRM look like? How could I use it to protect my privacy or limit what organizations can do with my data?
- snuxoll 11y agoLook at Active Directory Rights Management Services, prime example.
- Silhouette 11y agoTo give one practically useful example, the same kinds of technology that could potentially restrict access to content on your own devices could also restrict the use of information in the workplace, preventing the leakage of sensitive personal data due to inside jobs. This is a legitimate and very practical concern for organisations operating in fields like healthcare, finance and defence.
- mikeash 11y agoSo for example, my medical records might be DRMd with the keys in my possession, and I could give them to a clinic and give them read rights, but the DRM means they would have a hard time sending that data elsewhere without my permission?
- Silhouette 11y agoI suppose you could do that, though given the nature of medical records, keeping everything locked up so tightly that only the (potentially impaired) patient can give access seems unwise. I was more thinking that those organisations who do process medical records on your behalf -- your doctor, hospital, etc. -- could and should take steps to prevent the often very large number of staff they have from accessing an individual's records without proper authorisation. This would limit the ability for anything sensitive to be accessed by anyone without a reasonable clinical need for it or to be readily transferred to other systems, as well as creating a robust audit trail of access to sensitive data as well.
- mikeash 11y agoThat sort of system isn't DRM. Limiting access to data is just regular access control, which is common and works decently well. The unique thing about DRM is that it provides access to data but attempts to limit what you can do with that access, for example allowing you to view it only on certain devices. That's much harder and less useful. I can see how it could help prevent bad actors from causing trouble here, but it's secondary to having proper access control.
- Silhouette 11y agoThe unique thing about DRM is that it provides access to data but attempts to limit what you can do with that access, for example allowing you to view it only on certain devices. And that sort of thing is what I'm talking about. There are numerous applications where someone has a legitimate need to access certain data under certain conditions and for certain purposes, yet that same person does not need and should not have the ability to do other things with the same data. And if you think that's not useful, I would remind you that a very substantial proportion of all white collar crime is based on inside jobs.
- JupiterMoon 11y agoSo you mean what happens already in sensible systems?
- stcredzero 11y agoWhat if your email correspondence from companies was entirely handled through DRM that you controlled? What if you could revoke the right for a company to use your email? Basically, if such infrastructure were widespread, no company would actually have your email, unless they were to circumvent the DRM. Furthermore, such circumvention would then be covered under the DMCA, and mass circumvention would open up companies to class action lawsuits. (If properly implemented, either lawbreakers could be tracked, or the company that let the protected address fall into the wrong hands would be identified.) You could not say that such a circumstance would be unfavorable. Typically, people come up with an argument saying that DRM doesn't work, and that such tools wouldn't be available in a true and trustworthy form to individuals anyhow. Also, email isn't such a great example anymore, but having such control over one's medical records would be desirable.
- mikeash 11y agoWhat you describe would be way easier to implement by handing out unique tokens to each company, and then revoking tokens on my end. You can even do that right now by using a catch-all address, or the pretty common username+companynameandwhatever@example.com technique.
- stcredzero 11y agoI do say that email isn't such a good example anymore. Medical records would be a better example. But such tokens would be included in DRM protected addresses, and their circumvention harder to deny. (Tokens by themselves are deniable.)
- bad_user 11y agoFirst of all, you're talking about a doubly edged knife. You wouldn't "actually have" the received email either. Now imagine you're sexually harassed or blackmailed, but couldn't prove it, because your email vanishes just after you've read it. But more problematic is that you're forgetting about the analogue loophole. As long as I can take a photo of your crappy email, you only have the illusion of safety. Add to that the fact that currently there is no such thing as unbreakable DRM, mostly because it's a fundamentally flawed concept that can't work. DRM is security theater at best. > having such control over one's medical records would be desirable One thing that always bothered me is that programmers have the arrogance to think that technology can fix a broken society. Given that DRM is a broken concept, it wouldn't stop global adversaries like the NSA from mining your medical records. And then when your insurance company demands whatever records they want to do however they please, including selling that data to the highest bidder, threatening to reject your contract or claim, good luck explaining them about DRM and control.
- shawn-furyan 11y agoDRM should not be confused with cryptography. DRM uses cryptographic methods, but I've never heard of a use case where a user chose a DRM product rather than a more straight forward cryptographic product to protect themselves. Full disk encryption is a better tool for protecting yourself than SecuROM. In fact using SecuROM may well leave you more vulnerable to attack due to it's hacky obfuscation methods.
- stcredzero 11y agoDRM should not be confused with cryptography. I am not confusing DRM with cryptography. See the cousin comments in this thread. Full disk encryption is a better tool for protecting yourself than SecuROM. Doesn't help when you have to share data with companies and governments, and the information ends up on someone else's disk.
- shawn-furyan 11y ago> Doesn't help when you have to share data with companies and governments, and the information ends up on someone else's disk. FDE was an example among a vast array of encryption products. Attacking an non-comprehensive example as non-comprehensive isn't very enlightening. I still fail to see which DRM product you are suggesting is the proper tool for this situation. Even further, cryptography and careful allocation of trust seem to be a better solution than DRM for disseminating sensitive information since DRM is generally only a barrier, and not robust against concerted attack. That is to say, if you are disseminating information to untrustworthy sources via DRM, then in the great majority of cases, you can consider the information compromised. Most DRMed content is copyable with as simple a solution as recording your screen. Even HDCP can be defeated with a simple camcorder.
- stcredzero 11y agoI still fail to see which DRM product you are suggesting is the proper tool for this situation. I am and always was talking about the abstract concept of trusted execution. As of yet, there is no environment which is trustworthy from a technical or a political standpoint. Today's society's attitudes towards DRM are like what one would expect from the world of Orwell's 1984 towards cameras. We've only experienced a certain tool's use for oppression, so people's brains have turned off and they can't imagine the implications of the same tool being in the hands of the masses.