4 ms·
Not necessarily, depends on what exactly you put in the enclave. It's possible to design a system where the OS lives outside the enclave in untrusted memory. Th
by anonymousDan 11y ago
Not necessarily, depends on what exactly you put in the enclave. It's possible to design a system where the OS lives outside the enclave in untrusted memory. The assurance that your enclave memory is protected is provided by the hardware, and can be confirmed remotely by an attestation protocol. For more information I would recommend checking out a paper by Microsoft Research called "Shielding applications from an untrusted cloud with Haven" from OSDI' 14.
- therein 11y agoRing -1?
- teraflop 11y agoSure, but that's a totally different mechanism than the one discussed in this link. According to the presentation, it uses ephemeral keys that are randomly generated at boot, so it doesn't help with things like remote attestation.
- anonymousDan 11y agoNo, the whole point of SGX is that there is a unique key burned into each machine from which other keys are derived that allows you to attest the contents of each enclave's memory.
- teraflop 11y agoI thought we were talking about the "Memory Encryption Engine", which is what the link is describing. Slide 7 says the keys are "randomly generated at reset".