> How many people are qualified to "verify there's no backdoor to your CPU"? Certainly not your average user. I meant there are no backdoors in firmware. Some

> How many people are qualified to "verify there's no backdoor to your CPU"? Certainly not your average user. I meant there are no backdoors in firmware. Some poor phrasing on my part, sorry. Backdoors in CPUs are obviously a completely different issue altogether. > Allowing Secure Boot to be bypassed is a backdoor in itself. You can have open source implementation of Secure Boot as a Coreboot payload. One such implementation is Tiano Core (UEFI). > Allowing the end-user to modify the firmware at all also allows malicious actors to do the same. Modifying firmware to flash Coreboot usually involves at least switching jumpers or actually physically flashing the memory chip. But even if there’s no hardware switch you are still free to implement whatever security you like in the firmware. Because you control the firmware. So if you want to have signed payloads that’s just fine!