5 ms·

I think I'd rather have a machine that has a verified chain of trust from boot than one that will happily run anything.

by moonbug 11y ago

geofft 11y ago
Yup. You don't get software freedom if not only you but everyone else also has the freedom to control what your machine runs. Giving everyone control of your machine is as much of a non-solution as giving only your hardware manufacturer control of your machine; it's simply that one is a better short-term compromise.
- deno 11y ago
  > everyone else also has the freedom to control what your machine runs. > Giving everyone control of your machine like... [citation needed] Coreboot giving everyone access? The entire point of the project is so you know and can verify there’s no backdoor to your CPU. How do you turn it around 180°…? This is so dishonest.
  - geofft 11y ago
    You can ensure there's no backdoor in the machine as shipped from the manufacturer. That's extremely important and a good thing to have, and I'm not disputing that. What you'd like to do is make sure that there are no further backdoors, via bootkits, evil maid attacks, whatever. If I can reflash the firmware or insert myself into the boot process, who else can?
    - deno 11y ago
      There’s usually a jumper you can set on the motherboard that controls whether you can reflash firmware. So you can burn Coreboot and set it back. Also if someone can flash your firmware your security (on the software or physical access side) is already busted and it’s game over anyway.
    - zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC 11y ago
      If you cannot reflash the firmware or insert yourself into the boot process, who else still can? Just because your hardware prevents you from inspecting and modifying it, doesn't mean it prevents everyone else from doing so. Very much the opposite. If you can't inspect it, chances are it does allow others to use your hardware against you.
  - neckro23 11y ago
    How many people are qualified to "verify there's no backdoor to your CPU"? Certainly not your average user. If you can't trust your CPU, what can you trust? Allowing Secure Boot to be bypassed is a backdoor in itself. Allowing the end-user to modify the firmware at all also allows malicious actors to do the same.
    - deno 11y ago
      > How many people are qualified to "verify there's no backdoor to your CPU"? Certainly not your average user. I meant there are no backdoors in firmware. Some poor phrasing on my part, sorry. Backdoors in CPUs are obviously a completely different issue altogether. > Allowing Secure Boot to be bypassed is a backdoor in itself. You can have open source implementation of Secure Boot as a Coreboot payload. One such implementation is Tiano Core (UEFI). > Allowing the end-user to modify the firmware at all also allows malicious actors to do the same. Modifying firmware to flash Coreboot usually involves at least switching jumpers or actually physically flashing the memory chip. But even if there’s no hardware switch you are still free to implement whatever security you like in the firmware. Because you control the firmware. So if you want to have signed payloads that’s just fine!
    - zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC 11y ago
      > How many people are qualified to "verify there's no backdoor to your CPU"? More than the manufacturer, if it's open, and that's the point. The manufacturer has an interest or can be pressured into having an interest in keeping backdoors secret. The point is not that every user will themselves audit the firmware, the point is that everyone in principle could either learn to do it themselves or hire someone with the neccessary knowledge to do the audit for them. Food safety also isn't achieved by having everyone test their food in their own labs, but by anyone being able to hire a lab of their choice to do tests they want to have done. > Allowing the end-user to modify the firmware at all also allows malicious actors to do the same. And allowing the end-user to swap out the lock to their house also allows malicious actors to do the same? Just because you can swap out a flash chip on your mainboard, doesn't mean anyone can come into your house and do the same.
    - chei0aiV 11y ago
deno 11y ago
I prefer secure boot without backdoors. http://www.tianocore.org/ http://www.tianocore.org/
- chei0aiV 11y ago
  That has non-free code to read the FAT partition. It also really needs a security audit.

I think I'd rather have a machine that has a verified chain of trust from boot than one that will happily run anything.

by moonbug 11y ago

I think I'd rather have a machine that has a verified chain of trust from boot than one that will happily run anything.

Yup. You don't get software freedom if not only you but everyone else also has the freedom to control what your machine runs. Giving everyone control of your machine is as much of a non-solution as giving only your hardware manufacturer control of your machine; it's simply that one is a better short-term compromise.

deno 11y ago
> everyone else also has the freedom to control what your machine runs. > Giving everyone control of your machine like... [citation needed] Coreboot giving everyone access? The entire point of the project is so you know and can verify there’s no backdoor to your CPU. How do you turn it around 180°…? This is so dishonest.
- geofft 11y ago
  You can ensure there's no backdoor in the machine as shipped from the manufacturer. That's extremely important and a good thing to have, and I'm not disputing that. What you'd like to do is make sure that there are no further backdoors, via bootkits, evil maid attacks, whatever. If I can reflash the firmware or insert myself into the boot process, who else can?
  - deno 11y ago
    There’s usually a jumper you can set on the motherboard that controls whether you can reflash firmware. So you can burn Coreboot and set it back. Also if someone can flash your firmware your security (on the software or physical access side) is already busted and it’s game over anyway.
  - zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC 11y ago
    If you cannot reflash the firmware or insert yourself into the boot process, who else still can? Just because your hardware prevents you from inspecting and modifying it, doesn't mean it prevents everyone else from doing so. Very much the opposite. If you can't inspect it, chances are it does allow others to use your hardware against you.
- neckro23 11y ago
  How many people are qualified to "verify there's no backdoor to your CPU"? Certainly not your average user. If you can't trust your CPU, what can you trust? Allowing Secure Boot to be bypassed is a backdoor in itself. Allowing the end-user to modify the firmware at all also allows malicious actors to do the same.
  - deno 11y ago
    > How many people are qualified to "verify there's no backdoor to your CPU"? Certainly not your average user. I meant there are no backdoors in firmware. Some poor phrasing on my part, sorry. Backdoors in CPUs are obviously a completely different issue altogether. > Allowing Secure Boot to be bypassed is a backdoor in itself. You can have open source implementation of Secure Boot as a Coreboot payload. One such implementation is Tiano Core (UEFI). > Allowing the end-user to modify the firmware at all also allows malicious actors to do the same. Modifying firmware to flash Coreboot usually involves at least switching jumpers or actually physically flashing the memory chip. But even if there’s no hardware switch you are still free to implement whatever security you like in the firmware. Because you control the firmware. So if you want to have signed payloads that’s just fine!
  - zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC 11y ago
    > How many people are qualified to "verify there's no backdoor to your CPU"? More than the manufacturer, if it's open, and that's the point. The manufacturer has an interest or can be pressured into having an interest in keeping backdoors secret. The point is not that every user will themselves audit the firmware, the point is that everyone in principle could either learn to do it themselves or hire someone with the neccessary knowledge to do the audit for them. Food safety also isn't achieved by having everyone test their food in their own labs, but by anyone being able to hire a lab of their choice to do tests they want to have done. > Allowing the end-user to modify the firmware at all also allows malicious actors to do the same. And allowing the end-user to swap out the lock to their house also allows malicious actors to do the same? Just because you can swap out a flash chip on your mainboard, doesn't mean anyone can come into your house and do the same.
  - chei0aiV 11y ago

deno 11y ago

I prefer secure boot without backdoors. http://www.tianocore.org/ http://www.tianocore.org/

chei0aiV 11y ago
That has non-free code to read the FAT partition. It also really needs a security audit.