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Let's see if my logic works. It seems some motivations and negotiations are left out of the proposed solution. If I were C I would have voted no on A's proposa
by talmand 11y ago
Let's see if my logic works. It seems some motivations and negotiations are left out of the proposed solution.
If I were C I would have voted no on A's proposal and try to make a deal with D and E. The idea is that knowing if A were thrown overboard then B might be more apt to provide a more beneficial coin sharing program in an effort to save his life. After all, he just watched the previous guy get tossed overboard and die. The most I could lose would be 1 coin if B decided to try A's method on D and E and they went along with it.
The key is that I would have already negotiated a deal with D and E, if A or B doesn't share the wealth fairly then we vote to toss them. Once I'm in charge, I'll share the coins equally as possible.
- sokoloff 11y agoThat fails because one of the explicit stipulations in the problem is: "The pirates do not trust each other, and will neither make nor honor any promises between pirates apart from a proposed distribution plan that gives a whole number of gold coins to each pirate." I read that as "an actual proposal, by the leader" not as a "theoretical future proposal, iff that negotiator becomes the leader" and I believe that's the intended reading. Thus, D and E cannot trust that you'll hold your word to give them 33 coins each provided you get to be in charge.
- talmand 11y agoIf that were true then the whole thing falls apart as soon as the first proposal is made. They all have to trust that A will follow through with the proposal, of which they apparently do not. But yes, I glossed over that part apparently.
- the_af 11y agoThey do trust A (the first proposal). If all of them accept A's proposal, they are all committed to honoring it. What they cannot trust is any hypothetical proposals made by a pirate whose turn is not to make the current proposal. "I have the turn and I propose we split this way": trusted. "I don't have the turn yet, but when it's my turn, I promise I'll propose this / kill him / won't kill you": not trusted.
- the_af 11y agoMaking a deal like you propose is explicitly forbidden by the rules. Or more accurately, pirates don't trust each other and will not honor any deals beyond the current split proposal. Of course, pirates in real life wouldn't behave like this, but these are not real-life pirates.
- talmand 11y agoYes, I admit I missed that part from another response. But, as I said there, if there's no trust at all then how does any of it make any sense to begin with?
- the_af 11y agoThere is trust in only one thing, as per the rules of the game: that the current proposed split (and only the current one), if accepted by all pirates, will be carried out. Anything else cannot be trusted. Because the pirates are completely rational (think robots), they not only don't trust each other, they also know the rest don't trust them either. So no pirate will attempt any kind of deal.
- MagnumOpus 11y agoThis only works if C has the trust of D and E to honor his promises. And trust can only be developed in interated games. In a one-off game a rational player C will negotiate and then propose a 99-0-1 distribution.
- talmand 11y agoI guess I was going with the notion that this wasn't a group of pirates that had no prior interaction.
- the_af 11y agoPirates aren't hyperrational, so the whole game isn't a real-life scenario. Think robots, all playing with the same ruleset and having perfect knowledge of the game, if it helps.