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This clip [1], from the UK game show "Golden Balls", is a very entertaining example of a two-player zero-sum game EDIT: As explained in the replies, this is no
by J-dawg 11y ago
This clip [1], from the UK game show "Golden Balls", is a very entertaining example of a two-player zero-sum game
EDIT: As explained in the replies, this is not actually a zero-sum game.
[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S0qjK3TWZE8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S0qjK3TWZE8
- cousin_it 11y agoThat's not a zero-sum game, though. The total money awarded to both players isn't the same in all outcomes. That's the whole reason why the game isn't purely adversarial and it makes sense to negotiate. I remember seeing this clip in 2012, and back then I proposed a solution based on correlated equilibria which still seems pretty good to me: "We have two minutes to talk, right? I'm going to ask you to flip a coin (visibly to both of us) at the last possible moment, the exact second where we must cease talking. If the coin comes up heads, I promise I'll cooperate, you can just go ahead and claim the whole prize. If the coin comes up tails, I promise I'll defect. Please cooperate in this case, because you have nothing to gain by defecting, and anyway the arrangement is fair, isn't it?"
- drostie 11y agoThe comments mention that the rules were changed to disallow out-of-band bargaining after this event, which is important because this is one of the core solutions to the Prisoner's Dilemma (which is what they're playing, and is not a zero-sum game). The solution in general is contract law. The verbal agreement "If you do this and I do that then I will split the money 50/50 with you after the show" is a verbal contract which (due to the cameras recording the event) is nevertheless indisputable. You are giving them a task to accomplish in exchange for a promised financial reward. They have all rights to sue you in court if they did what you asked and you didn't pay them for it. What's really interesting is that he promises to split 50/50. In theory a rational actor who could commit to these things absolutely would say, "Look, I am pre-committing to steal, and I will give you $100 after the game if you choose split." Then it is still rational for the other guy to choose "split" (getting $100) rather than "steal" (getting 0). However most people, in study after study, will be insulted by the disparity of only getting 1% of the winning, and the insult is magnified by the camera: it is public shame. So in some sense being insulted by unfairness introduces out-of-band costs that also tend to pull you to splitting the money, and splitting it more fairly.
- bduerst 11y agoBasically there are qualitative reputation costs at play, which is why it's not really a zero sum. An anonymous, blind experiment would be more interesting, but less entertaining.
- ThrustVectoring 11y agoThere's decision-theoretic reasons to be the sort of person who refuses unfair bargains that make you slightly better off. Specifically, people will give you much fairer bargains, because otherwise you might refuse them.
- StavrosK 11y agoBy the way, in some cultures the opposite happened (they viewed being given large sums as an obligation they could never repay and were displeased with them).