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>don't rely on any advice they give about cryptography. The only crypto advice I see in this guide is on page 37. https://www.owasp.org/images/6/67/OWASPAppli
by danjoc 11y ago
>don't rely on any advice they give about cryptography.
The only crypto advice I see in this guide is on page 37.
https://www.owasp.org/images/6/67/OWASPApplicationSecurityVerificationStandard3.0.pdf https://www.owasp.org/images/6/67/OWASPApplicationSecurityVe...
That entire section is incorrect?
- sarciszewski 11y ago> Verify that all cryptographic modules fail securely, and errors are handled in a way that does not enable oracle padding. You should be using ECDH, EdDSA, and (authenticated) stream ciphers. Padding shouldn't even be a thing. > Verify that cryptographic algorithms used by the application have been validated against FIPS 140-2 or an equivalent standard. FIPS 140-2 is bullshit. Try being FIPS 140-2 compliant on a Debian Squeeze server running Apache 2.2 (i.e. TLS 1.0 is the highest you can go) while also being PCI compliant. Spoiler: The only way to be both PCI and FIPS 140-2 compliant is to use TLS 1.2 with AES-GCM and SHA2. Standards rarely make good cryptographic choices. Winners of cryptography competitions, on the other hand, do. > Verify that cryptographic modules operate in their approved mode according to their published security policies. This is so vague it's not actionable.
- tptacek 11y ago"Oracle padding"? This is like Malcolm Gladwell's Igon Values thing, except it's in a prescriptive technical document. Nope nope nope. If you're going to make security recommendations, you have to know what you're talking about .
- sarciszewski 11y agoHahaha. Yeah, I parsed what I thought they intended to say rather than what they said. :(