3 ms·
See https://sel4.systems https://sel4.systems
by nl 11y ago
See https://sel4.systems https://sel4.systems
- nickpsecurity 11y agoOne of the best in the field. :) Although I think they just have dev assurance. Not total high assurance. An early one with total was GEMSOS by Schell, one of INFOSEC's founders: http://www.iwia.org/2005/Schell2005.PDF http://www.iwia.org/2005/Schell2005.PDF Smartcard OS by Karger, another founder of INFOSEC: https://www.acsac.org/2012/workshops/law/pdf/Lessons.pdf https://www.acsac.org/2012/workshops/law/pdf/Lessons.pdf A comparable one for dev assurance, but maybe easier to emulate, was CompCert. Testing of it against many other compilers validated formal verification gave best reliability. http://gallium.inria.fr/~xleroy/talks/compcert-lctes08.pdf http://gallium.inria.fr/~xleroy/talks/compcert-lctes08.pdf Ironically, Microsoft compete neck-to-neck with seL4 in terms of verification with their excellent work on VerveOS: https://people.csail.mit.edu/jeanyang/papers/pldi117-yang.pdf https://people.csail.mit.edu/jeanyang/papers/pldi117-yang.pd...
- munin 11y agothat's a proof that the system corresponds to a specification though
- nickpsecurity 11y agoThat's right: a formal specification, formal security model, and proof the spec implements it. An implementation formally proven to implement that spec will then posses the security property unless done in by stuff not covered by that model. Which is where EAL6/7's other assurance activities come in.