> I hope the Tor Project has information on the attack is looking into ways to mitigate this. But if it's due to the protocol nature, then maybe it's time to lo

> I hope the Tor Project has information on the attack is looking into ways to mitigate this. But if it's due to the protocol nature, then maybe it's time to look for a successor (we aren't using WEP anymore, right?) The attacks on Tor are largely in the form of: A) Outright implementation flaws [e.g. Software bugs ] B) Malicious actors deploying Tor nodes [e.g. On July 4 2014 we found a group of relays that we assume were trying to deanonymize users. They appear to have been targeting people who operate or access Tor hidden services. The attack involved modifying Tor protocol headers to do traffic confirmation attacks. https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-relay-early-traffic-confirmation-attack https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-relay... ] > A traffic confirmation attack is possible when the attacker controls or observes the relays on both ends of a Tor circuit and then compares traffic timing, volume, or other characteristics to conclude that the two relays are indeed on the same circuit. If the first relay in the circuit (called the "entry guard") knows the IP address of the user, and the last relay in the circuit knows the resource or destination she is accessing, then together they can deanonymize her. You can read more about traffic confirmation attacks, including pointers to many research papers, at this blog post from 2009: Pretty much the only defense is to control the entry nodes you use yourself by: https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#EntryGuards https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#EntryGuards > Restricting your entry nodes may also help against attackers who want to run a few Tor nodes and easily enumerate all of the Tor user IP addresses. (Even though they can't learn what destinations the users are talking to, they still might be able to do bad things with just a list of users.) However, that feature won't really become useful until we move to a "directory guard" design as well. Its an inherent problem with a low latency anonymity network that is really an open research problem. However, controlling your entry nodes has a different problem: 1) It pretty clearly links you to you entering the tor network via a consistent sent of nodes. 2) Capturing these nodes via the DC and warrants/legal action has been done in the past. As any is going to be able to find these nodes since they are no longer randomly selected... 3) Once you are actively targeted you are just as vulnerable.