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I agree with your thoughts on the decision making behind NASP. Even while it was still COPPER CANYON, doubts were being raised. Most of the big decisions to pro
by high_frontier 11y ago
I agree with your thoughts on the decision making behind NASP. Even while it was still COPPER CANYON, doubts were being raised. Most of the big decisions to proceed seem to have been made after relatively brief presentations with limited technical detail or discussion. NASP was a case of selling a big picture without stopping to ask how possible it really was.
Personally, I find the X-33 more frustrating as this got far closer to flight and although it may never have led to VentureStar it would have been a great hypersonic testbed
- Gravityloss 11y agoNowadays we do get critical articles about programs like the Joint Strike Fighter, but often they seem a little bit besides the point, for example comparing it to seventies design paradigms. The lightweight fighter mafia is emphasizing dogfighting, visual identification and gun kills, from an era when missiles were very unreliable and there was no stealth. I guess it would require a lot of expertise and access to rare information, to be able to evaluate the JSF on its own merits. Stillion and Sweetman have been the most interesting reads. I think the problem with X-33 was that it was too big and risky for an experimental-only platform. If you want to develop things like aerospike engines or composite multilobe tanks, you should first have ground tests and then relatively small demonstrators using a lot of off the shelf technology. It makes no sense to bet so much stuff on a multi-faceted big expensive program that can fail when any of it components doesn't deliver. Or if you want to build something big, either use proven technology or retire risk in smaller programs first. I guess people were emulating Apollo and the Space Shuttle. They had high performance but were not flexible or low cost, for a reason.