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> it's not the job of SSL to ensure a domain name is not owned by someone it shouldn't be. That's correct. CAs checked identity back in the 90s, but stopped an
by nailer 11y ago
> it's not the job of SSL to ensure a domain name is not owned by someone it shouldn't be.
That's correct. CAs checked identity back in the 90s, but stopped and moved to domain validation for most certificates. The article mentions explicitly: the certificates aren't fake, they're just DV, and that's what DV is. Obviously most consumers have no idea about that, and have been conditioned to trust any kind of SSL.
The main issue asides from most consumers having no idea what DV is, is that Section 4.2 of the baseline requirements - which applies to all CAs - asks CAs to check for 'high risk' domains. That's clearly broken here.
Certificate transparency records for the domains in question:
https://crt.sh/?q=google.com.%25 https://crt.sh/?q=google.com.%25
- detaro 11y ago> Obviously most consumers have no idea about that, and have been conditioned to trust any kind of SSL. Is that actually the case? If I see a "check for HTTPS!" reminder, most of them clearly show and talk about the name from a DV cert.