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I think you're being unfair. The author has given us many clear issues with closed source algorithm that would not exist with open source algorithms. Showing t

I think you're being unfair. The author has given us many clear issues with closed source algorithm that would not exist with open source algorithms. Showing that the benefits outweigh the costs would require a model of the impact the (closed or open) algorithmic judgments on the society, and thus a model of the society itself. Such model would inevitably be subject to even more subjectivity and discussions. If you're not buying it, it's your choice, and you may even be right. But that doesn't make the whole argument unreceivable. Instead, you should mention the benefits of closed source algorithms for the society, they're not that obvious to me.

ikeboy 11y ago
"the alternative is much worse." That's a definite statement, and shouldn't be made without such a model. If you only have handwavey models, you can't claim one is "much worse" than the others. The level of confidence isn't justified. I'm fine with a list of possible bad outcomes, but don't claim way A is much worse than way B without stronger evidence. >Instead, you should mention the benefits of closed source algorithms for the society, they're not that obvious to me. One is mentioned in the part I quoted: that they're harder to circumvent. This isn't the same as regular security software where they theoretically are secure, but practically have holes, and so there's gains by opening it up and letting people report holes. There would be no theoretical security model here, it would only be probabilistic. There may not be a "patch" for the kind of holes (I'll give an example soon). So security by obscurity might make more sense here than in general. Example: suppose our data shows that people that drive car X have a greater security risk. If this is kept secret, we are able to more effectively target people (probably, many different factors will combine until someone is an extreme risk, but this is simplified.) The fact that X is weak evidence of risk is information that becomes useless relatively soon after it is publicized (because potential terrorists just put "don't buy X" on their checklists.) So publicizing the algorithm would concretely lead to worse results. Realistically, car model probably isn't too predictive, but possibly the union of all behaviors that are easy to change when known predicts risk reasonably well.

ikeboy 11y ago

"the alternative is much worse." That's a definite statement, and shouldn't be made without such a model. If you only have handwavey models, you can't claim one is "much worse" than the others. The level of confidence isn't justified. I'm fine with a list of possible bad outcomes, but don't claim way A is much worse than way B without stronger evidence. >Instead, you should mention the benefits of closed source algorithms for the society, they're not that obvious to me. One is mentioned in the part I quoted: that they're harder to circumvent. This isn't the same as regular security software where they theoretically are secure, but practically have holes, and so there's gains by opening it up and letting people report holes. There would be no theoretical security model here, it would only be probabilistic. There may not be a "patch" for the kind of holes (I'll give an example soon). So security by obscurity might make more sense here than in general. Example: suppose our data shows that people that drive car X have a greater security risk. If this is kept secret, we are able to more effectively target people (probably, many different factors will combine until someone is an extreme risk, but this is simplified.) The fact that X is weak evidence of risk is information that becomes useless relatively soon after it is publicized (because potential terrorists just put "don't buy X" on their checklists.) So publicizing the algorithm would concretely lead to worse results. Realistically, car model probably isn't too predictive, but possibly the union of all behaviors that are easy to change when known predicts risk reasonably well.