I've given some thought on what a safe browser for tor would be like. Since it's hard to come up with the list of all possible information leaks, I suggest not

I've given some thought on what a safe browser for tor would be like. Since it's hard to come up with the list of all possible information leaks, I suggest not attempting to do so. The system goes like this: 1) You open a new tab in your favorite browser. At this point, a new instance of a read-only, lightweight, virtual machine is resumed. The virtual machine doesn't know about tor, but its entire network traffic is torrified by the hypervisor. 2) The tab now displays a VNC connection to the virtual machine you just spun up. Now, it's possible that some things will leak through the VM, but it should also be easier to control than an entire browser running in your OS. For example, enforcing that the VM image be read-only ensures that once a tab is closed, all sources of history are gone... no cookies, no history, no browser settings. You only need to whack one mole. Yes, there might be exploits that jump out of the hypervisor, but these aren't as common as browser exploits and you would need both to jump out.