3 ms·
>So naturally, if all the examples you have of successful startups involve people with characteristic X, and you have no data about people without characteristi
by avs733 11y ago
>So naturally, if all the examples you have of successful startups involve people with characteristic X, and you have no data about people without characteristic X, the rational thing to do as a VC or potential early employee looking for startups, or a founder or hiring manager looking for employees, is to look for people with characteristic X. Let someone else do the research; it's not up to you to invest your money or time on figuring out if people without characteristic X can also be successful.
I tend to take what you are saying a little differently. It is 'rational' in the sense of the heuristics (e.g. the recognizability heuristic) that people commonly use to deal with probability. However, the underlying philosophy (i.e. constraints/assumptions) rely on the certain characteristics of the problem for them to actually be rational instead of just seem rational. We use probability heuristics a lot, poorly, and uncorrelated to the statistical expertise of those using the heuristic. We use them exactly because they seem rational, even when they are not.
To go way back in economics history (Frank Knight), they rely on analytical uncertainty...which the human brain has a strong bias towards. Analytical uncertainty relies upon a potential outcome space being knowable and independent of the actions of those making the predictions. Knight argues that in entrepreneurship the future performance is fundamentally not predictable in this way. The result is that the classical conceptions of uncertainty, probability, and (which is grounded on their being a tangibly solvable or characterizable uncertainty) risk do not apply/are not appropriate. Generally these more 'Knightian' conceptions are where we see truly new ideas (i.e. disruption) come from in ways that look obvious and form new markets in retrospect but are not foreseeable using a priori prediction tools.
Saying that X is stable is accurate...it is choosing to make a prediction, which is fine. I would argue that it is better approached in a Bayesian sense to try and figure out whether X is really the thing you are looking for or merely a symptom that matches your algorithm for the underlying nugget. However what is often problematic to success is a reliance on these attempts to predict what is fundamentally unpredictable, especially for startups[1]. The successes of prediction (what successes there are) are more traceable to the existence of Nash/Nash-like equilibrium in these newly created, previously unpredictable markets where there is space for competition simply because the new markets crystallize very quickly once they are initiated. The speed of crystallization (and the ability to make money via prediction) has always been a product of the rate of information dissemination being greater than the ability of companies to grow.
Your Harvard drop out may incrementally improve NoSQL, she might be convincing, and she might be worth a large long term investment with a measurable/calculable risk for a target ROI. However, your Juliard student may have a higher potential to fundamentally shift NoSQL thinking and be worth a small (hypothesis driven)investment to test the potential that we cannot calculate. What you are interested in as an investor is largely up to you but they are not interchangeable. This stuff feeds into so much of the parts of the startup ecosystem that work and don't.
[please forgive the state of this response, it was written quickly at my bedtime...mostly a random statistical aside to your larger point, I kind of tangented at 'market like the startup world']
[1]Wiltbank, R., Read, S., Dew, N., & Sarasvathy, S. D. (2009). Prediction and control under uncertainty: Outcomes in angel investing. Journal of Business Venturing, 24(2), 116–133. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2007.11.004 http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2007.11.004
- geofft 11y agoYeah, I think I don't disagree with any of that. To clarify a bit, I assert (but don't have any good proof for): 1. If you're involved with a startup, you're inclined to take risks (explore unexplored spaces in the market) on specific things that are closely correlated with the specific experiment the startup is investigating, but not particularly more willing than non-startup folks -- and probably less willing, because of how much risk you already have -- to do risky things outside of that specific experiment. If you want to place one risky bet, that's worth doing. If you want to place dozens of risky bets on the same venture, you'll lose. (VCs know this, and place dozens of risky bets one per venture.) For instance, just about no startup will, or will be advised to, run on a nonstandard OS just in case there's some secret sauce. There are certainly a few, but they have founders who believe firmly, a priori, that the secret sauce exists and the market hasn't recognized it. ~Nobody says, "Well, we built our system on AIX because nobody uses AIX so we figured we might get competitive advantage out of it." 2. Yes, the Juilliard drop-out might do way better than the Harvard one. But in the (hypothetical) case that you have literally zero information to differentiate the two founders other than their school -- let's say, they have the same programming background and ability, their parents pushed them both towards music, both were admitted to Harvard but one's Juilliard application was lost in the mail -- very few investors would prefer the Juilliard kid.