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Rowhammer.js: Root privileges for web apps?
- MasterScrat 11y agoI can't load the page: "Secure Connection Failed". edit: video file is here http://c3media.vsos.ethz.ch/congress/2015/webm-hd/32c3-7197-en-de-Rowhammerjs_Root_privileges_for_web_apps_webm-hd.webm http://c3media.vsos.ethz.ch/congress/2015/webm-hd/32c3-7197-...
- antouank 11y agoVideo : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LT54Jq_0kJk https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LT54Jq_0kJk
- Robadob 11y agoInterestingly, in response to the first question they state that allegedly some brands of ECC memory are also vulnerable (by also hammering the checksum rows).
- dogma1138 11y agoSECDED ECC will be vulnerable to hammer attacks that flip more than 2 bits in a row.
- wazoox 11y agoThe paper is available here: http://arxiv.org/abs/1507.06955 http://arxiv.org/abs/1507.06955
- th0br0 11y agoSlides: https://events.ccc.de/congress/2015/Fahrplan/system/event_attachments/attachments/000/002/815/original/slides.pdf https://events.ccc.de/congress/2015/Fahrplan/system/event_at...
- _Codemonkeyism 11y agoNice work, but didn't show an exploit or have one. The "?" in the end of the talk title should tip you off, same click bait as everyone else uses, sad.
- _Codemonkeyism 11y agoWhat is wrong with my comment to get negative karma? 0.) It is nice work a.) There is no exploit shown b.) They have no working exploit c.) The title is used as click bait with the common adding-"?"-to-the-end tactic d.) It is sad that security researchers would use c.)
- fabulist 11y agoTheres nothing wrong with presenting work at an intermediate stage. For instance, Chris Valasek and Charlie Miller presented their automotive research a year before they could control cars remotely[0]. They cobbled together the primitives you'd need to build an exploit, thus proving it to be exploitable. That seems like a reasonable time to share your work to me. The title is provocative, but not to the extent which makes it clickbait. [0] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tnYO4U0h_wY https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tnYO4U0h_wY
- _Codemonkeyism 11y agoThen I didn't made myself understandable. I didn't say that it is. The title of Chris talk is modestly worded as "A Survey of Remote Automotive Attack Surfaces" not "A root exploit of the car bus system and engine management?". I wanted to express that the title of the talk suggests that there exists something that is called Rowhammer.js that gives root access through the browser. And there isn't.
- fabulist 11y agoIt takes more than an attention-grabbing headline to make something clickbait. There is no real financial incentive here; they gave their talk a provocative title so people would show up. There are not misrepresenting the facts; you can get root from JavaScript using Rowhammer, and they'll tell you how. Additionally, there is something called Rowhammer.js: https://github.com/IAIK/rowhammerjs https://github.com/IAIK/rowhammerjs
- _Codemonkeyism 11y ago
- zwegner 11y agoHmm, it seems that all the pieces aren't in place yet. If I'm understanding correctly, the exploit technique they use relies on cross-page errors (causing errors in one page with accesses to another page), because the page with errors needs to get freed to the operating system to potentially reuse as PTEs, while still having the ability to cause the errors. There's a line on one of the slides that says you can use timing information to get cross-page information, but I'm really not sure what that means, and how feasible it is. In addition, they need to find a double-bit error, one that would change both the writable bit and an address bit, if a PTE was in that place in memory. They mentioned that they tested their laptop for these errors, and they're possible, but much rarer--how rare? This point was kind of just glossed over. I'd guess that these two combined would make an exploitable error much more unlikely.
- creshal 11y ago> how rare? This point was kind of just glossed over. It varies widely between memory chips, memory controllers, and a variety of other factors. Not to mention, Rowhammer was first disclosed early last year, and many vendors started shipping BIOS updates to prevent Rowhammer on the memory controller level months ago; additionally the problem has been fixed from the start on DDR4 RAM (the bug has been known to memory vendors before, but not been deemed a security problem, so the fix wasn't applied retroactively to DDR3). So finding actually exploitable devices now is going to be difficult.
- yuhong 11y agoTo be more precise, the feature in DDR4 is called TRR and the one in DDR3 is called pTRR.
- revelation 11y agoWho has ever updated their BIOS? Unless Windows now does this silently.
- creshal 11y agoCorporate IT should hopefully have mechanisms for it in place, because those tend to fix a lot of problems… and security relevant bugs. Edit: And additionally, yes, Windows 10 can ship BIOS updates, assuming the hardware and UEFI supports it.
- mehrdada 11y agoThe speaker makes fun of Intel for calling a relatively trivial mapping of CPU physical address to DRAM addresses in the memory controller a "hash function". I'd like to point out that it is actually a hash function mathematically. The term "hash function" has a much looser definition and does not necessarily have any of the cryptographic properties that are common in cryptographically-secure hash functions. It's a clash of terminology, not a poor design decision by Intel. Intel has probably no interest in obfuscating that mapping and the fact that they leave it undocumented is probably just because they don't want to make compatibility guarantees if you somehow rely on the mapping for some reason.