>Any such question and any possible answer are still pheonomena that arise inside consciousness. This is an important point, but I don't think the best course

>Any such question and any possible answer are still pheonomena that arise inside consciousness. This is an important point, but I don't think the best course of action is to mark consciousness as something that lies outside the scope of science. I certainly think that there are some broader problems to be solved which involve how one deals with investigation into a domain that appears to be reflexive. "Consciousness" is a valid domain of investigation, but the question to ask becomes "Can we come to an agreement over how to distinguish what we are investigating?" Additionally, can we really call consciousness an "object" of investigation? The problem is that we, the subject, are investigating an object, which is us, the subject. It seems like there is some analogue of the subject-object problem that injects itself into the situation at that point. The investigation of consciousness (among other things) becomes muddled when the majority of participants in the discourse can't stabilize on how to actually distinguish or demarcate consciousness as an object of investigation - that problem is tangled because the act of explaining consciousness presupposes consciousness. Similarly, we must use the condition of living in order to explain life, and we must use the condition of "being embedded in language" in order to describe language. One cannot escape those systems in their attempts to describe them. A scientist's description of consciousness must necessarily account for the process by which he describes it. But this isn't anything too radical or new. I'm not sure this means that it's something beyond the grasp of science.