The Economist also has a piece advocating strong crypto and opposing backdoors : The Economist | Internet security: When back doors backfire http://www.economi

The Economist also has a piece advocating strong crypto and opposing backdoors : The Economist | Internet security: When back doors backfire http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21684783-some-spy-agencies-favour-back-doors-encryption-software-who-will-use-them-when-back?frsc=dg%7Cd http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21684783-some-spy-agen... One important aspect that is missing from all of these articles though, is that strong encryption doesn't actually lock spooks out. It prevents them from conducting bulk surveillance, but not surveillance in general. One of the most important things we learned from the Snowden revelations is the existence and efficacy of the NSA Tailored Access Operations group, which brags that it can hack into any device, anywhere in the world. They use software bugs and backdoors to get into devices and install keyloggers, remote control software, and similar. They get around encryption by using the rest of the attack surface. Many HN readers are involved enough in software and hardware to understand that it approaches impossible to protect yourself indefinitely against an advanced persistent threat like the TAO. So if NSA can already get around encryption when they have a specific target, the only thing encryption blocks them from doing is Orwellian mass surveillance... Something which statisticians agree is useless, technologists agree is dangerous, and voters agree is intrusive. It kind of blows up the whole security vs privacy false dichotomy, and I wish I saw it in the dialog more.