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The Crypto Warrior
- 2close4comfort 11y agoMatt Blaze is the man! I remember reading the cypherpunks mailing list and following the clipper chip saga, there is no better person to be on the good side of the Crypto War.
- alexandrerond 11y agoToday 32c3 had a session on the same topic by EFF Deputy Executive Director and General Counsel Kurt Opsahl. Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BweBCNBxJxM https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BweBCNBxJxM Session description: https://events.ccc.de/congress/2015/Fahrplan/events/7386.html https://events.ccc.de/congress/2015/Fahrplan/events/7386.htm...
- ohthehugemanate 11y agoThe Economist also has a piece advocating strong crypto and opposing backdoors : The Economist | Internet security: When back doors backfire http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21684783-some-spy-agencies-favour-back-doors-encryption-software-who-will-use-them-when-back?frsc=dg%7Cd http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21684783-some-spy-agen... One important aspect that is missing from all of these articles though, is that strong encryption doesn't actually lock spooks out. It prevents them from conducting bulk surveillance, but not surveillance in general. One of the most important things we learned from the Snowden revelations is the existence and efficacy of the NSA Tailored Access Operations group, which brags that it can hack into any device, anywhere in the world. They use software bugs and backdoors to get into devices and install keyloggers, remote control software, and similar. They get around encryption by using the rest of the attack surface. Many HN readers are involved enough in software and hardware to understand that it approaches impossible to protect yourself indefinitely against an advanced persistent threat like the TAO. So if NSA can already get around encryption when they have a specific target, the only thing encryption blocks them from doing is Orwellian mass surveillance... Something which statisticians agree is useless, technologists agree is dangerous, and voters agree is intrusive. It kind of blows up the whole security vs privacy false dichotomy, and I wish I saw it in the dialog more.
- oconnor663 11y agoI'm worried about taking the position that mass surveillance is totally useless. It'll backfire if we ever find out that mass surveillance prevented some attack somewhere. Only a matter of time.
- panarky 11y agoHow can an arcane, complex, technical argument ever prevail against raw emotional appeals? "the iPhone will become the phone of choice for the pedophile" [1] (see also terrorist, serial killer, etc.) Immediately after the Paris attacks: "If you create a product that allows these monsters to behave in this way, that’s a big problem." [2] Atrocities are inevitable, and whether the perpetrators use encryption or not, our leaders seize each disaster as an opportunity to push their surveillance agenda. All the informed discussions on HN are worthless against this kind of emotional propaganda. [1] https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/09/26/the-phone-of-choice-for-the-pedophile/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/201... [2] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/16/cia-director-john-brennan-criticises-surveillance-reform-paris-attacks http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/16/cia-director-jo...
- kbart 11y agoWe need more experts like Matt Blaze (or Bruce Schneier) that do understand technical side of the problem, but can also communicate with non-technical people without going too deep to win this "crypto war". A very good point: "MB: It may be true that encryption makes certain investigations of crime more difficult. It can close down certain investigative techniques or make it harder to get access to certain kinds of electronic evidence. But it also prevents crime by making our computers, our infrastructure, our medical records, our financial records, more robust against criminals. It prevents crime. On balance, the use of encryption, just like the use of good locks on doors, has the net effect of preventing a lot more crime than it might assist."
- jrapdx3 11y agoThe recurring debate described in the article comes down to prevention vs. cure, a dichotomy very familiar to medical practitioners. Prevention of dysfunction has been a principle of particular merit, the "gold standard". That is, preservation of healthy status, is worth far more than mitigating damage after it occurs. In the health arena, immunization is a great example. Preventing a disease reduces suffering and costs of care by orders of magnitude. The few bad reactions, even the cost of rare fatal outcomes pale in comparison to the upside benefit. (I'm told it's a good year for flu vaccine, I got my flu shot last month. If it lets me avoid having the flu that's very beneficial to me.) As Blaze convincingly remarks the value of preventing crime is enormous in terms of the benefit that it yields. In my world, one that Blaze talks about, breaches of confidential health records are matters of great concern for the tremendous negative impact caused. From what's reported (and comments from people I know in the EHR industry), those systems are vulnerable to intrusions. If secure non-backdoored encryption adds even a shallow layer of protection, that would give a worthy benefit. Blaze implies even good encryption models are no guarantee that will solve the problems. Often said here on HN, "security is hard, very hard" to get right. But to the extent its application prevents criminals from actually committing crimes it will far outweigh to damage done by criminals that aren't caught because they could keep their destructive activity secret. I could add quite a long riff on the near impossibility of humans keeping secrets, anyway it seems not in our nature to be good at it. Too much reader torment to go on about it now, prevention is definitely the key.
- dawnbreez 11y agoI like to allude to the TSA's keys when talking about this. It took, what, a week for a TSA agent to post a closeup of their "secure" keys, and for someone to replicate them with a 3D printer? It's absurd.