Well, they do get to the reason it's done this way a couple of paragraphs in: > Of course, keeping a backup of your recovery key in your Microsoft account is g

Well, they do get to the reason it's done this way a couple of paragraphs in: > Of course, keeping a backup of your recovery key in your Microsoft account is genuinely useful for probably the majority of Windows users, which is why Microsoft designed the encryption scheme, known as “device encryption,” this way. If something goes wrong and your encrypted Windows computer breaks, you’re going to need this recovery key to gain access to any of your files. Microsoft would rather give their customers crippled disk encryption than risk their data. > “When a device goes into recovery mode, and the user doesn’t have access to the recovery key, the data on the drive will become permanently inaccessible. Based on the possibility of this outcome and a broad survey of customer feedback we chose to automatically backup the user recovery key,” a Microsoft spokesperson told me. “The recovery key requires physical access to the user device and is not useful without it.” The crux of the matter is that the article is trying to confuse readers of the purpose of the encryption. The purpose of Windows "device encryption" is to keep anyone other than you from using your device or getting data off your drive. If you're worried about Microsoft stealing your files, they don't need your key: they just need to wait for you to log in. The only reason Microsoft has the key by default is because users inevitably forget their password and people would be very, very upset if that meant all their data disappeared, just as the above quoted paragraphs suggest. And if you're a power user who really knows what you want, then you don't have to let Microsoft have the key to your device. It sounds like a pretty sane system to me and a non-issue. > Or a law enforcement or spy agency could send Microsoft a request for all data in your account, which would legally compel them to hand over your recovery key, which they could do even if the first thing you do after setting up your computer is delete it. > As Green puts it, “Your computer is now only as secure as that database of keys held by Microsoft, which means it may be vulnerable to hackers, foreign governments, and people who can extort Microsoft employees.” The status quo was that if law enforcement or criminals seized your computer, they by default could access all your files. By encrypting the device by default, they at least added an additional hurdle for law enforcement and made it all but impossible for the common thief. I don't see much to complain about other than it would be nice if Home users had the full Bitlocker feature.