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End-to-end encryption is useless without endpoint security, i.e. security of the device you're using. As far as I can tell, all new chips have something like t
by Cieplak 11y ago
End-to-end encryption is useless without endpoint security, i.e. security of the device you're using. As far as I can tell, all new chips have something like the Intel Management Engine, which allows out-of-band access to the device. It takes about 6 lines of VHDL to modify a CPU so that if it receives a specific combination of instructions, it will transition to ring 0. That could even be added to the microcode so you wouldn't even be able to find it with a microscope. That essentially means if someone knew the right combination of instructions, a simple javascript expression could give you kernel level access to the machine.
- pipermerriam 11y agoDespite how troubling this is, I have trouble accepting that end-to-end encryption is useless. It still offers significant protection from being monitored even if that protection can be theoretically circumvented by lower level methods.
- Cieplak 11y ago+1 You're absolutely right; I really just meant to say that it could be circumvented by specific parties. We absolutely do need end-to-end encryption everywhere to protect information while in transit. But if someone is worried about a tyrannical government, then end-to-end encryption may not solve that person's problem.
- Animats 11y agoMaybe we could use parts from different governments to check each other. ARM CPUs are available from US-controlled sources and China-controlled sources. An Intel ARM CPU and an Allwinner ARM CPU, run in lockstep with comparators checking the bus transactions, could be useful.
- archimedespi 11y agoTwo different vendors' CPUs running in lockstep won't have their buses equal each other anyway, due to differences in implementation. Even more so, you have to have different code for a Allwinner vs an Intel ARM CPU, since they have different memory-mappings, peripherals, etc.
- Zigurd 11y ago> End-to-end encryption is useless without endpoint security No, not in a practical sense. Securing data in transit and at rest drgrades the value of breaking endpoint security, and it degrades the value of massive internet snooping. Breaking endpoint security, one machine at a time, and exfiltrating data, is vastly riskier than hoovering it up from the backbone. It is more likely to be noticed, and the exfiltration traced. It doesn't scale well. Endpoint security sucks now, but if people, governments, and enterprises find out data being exfiltrated from their machines, the demand for secure hardware will increase.
- nickysielicki 11y agoWe need funding of OpenRISC and RISC-V.