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My OS https://webconverger.com/ https://webconverger.com/ gets you mostly there. The slate is wiped clean between sessions like https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pr
by hendry 11y ago
My OS https://webconverger.com/ https://webconverger.com/ gets you mostly there. The slate is wiped clean between sessions like https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privacy_mode https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privacy_mode of course.
- schoen 11y agoWhile an OS that doesn't preserve state is an important component of Rutkowska's proposal, and your OS might be one basis for that component, I don't think this is "mostly there" in terms of everything that the paper discusses. Much of what's new in the paper is about hardware issues, especially because it's concerned with firmware attacks that are already being used by attackers like NSA, and that other people clearly understand how to develop in principle. With these firmware attacks, compromising a device at one point in time may allow the compromise to persist even if the user reinstalls the OS or replaces it with a different one. One way to see this paper is as a response to http://www.slideshare.net/hashdays/why-johnny-cant-tell-if-he-is-compromised http://www.slideshare.net/hashdays/why-johnny-cant-tell-if-h... proposing more details of a safer future platform. Right now, someone who can briefly get kernel-level control on a machine intended to run your OS might be able to reprogram the hard drive firmware. At that point you have a serious authenticity challenge when booting your OS, because the hard drive can alter the contents of particular binaries at the moment they're read from disk. There are some powerful software-only defenses against this, but if an attacker knows which ones you use, they can probably design an attack that evades those.