3 ms·
Cloudflare and others believe [1] the risk can be much reduced by new, carefully enforced issuing policies on the part of certificate authorities. The vulnerab
by michaelt 11y ago
Cloudflare and others believe [1] the risk can be much reduced by new, carefully enforced issuing policies on the part of certificate authorities.
The vulnerability of SHA-1 isn't that it's feasible to generate an input that will produce a checksum of your choice - it's that it's feasible to generate two inputs that will produce the same checksum. This is orders of magnitude easier, due to the to the birthday problem [2].
The SHA-1 the certificate authority generates to sign isn't just for the private key in the certificate; it's also for metadata like the URL and the powers the certificate grants. So to successfully exploit the weakness of SHA-1 you not only have to find a collision between good and evil certs, you also have to get a CA to sign the good cert without fiddling with the metadata and hence changing the SHA-1.
The proposal is that CAs should start systematically adding a random serial number to every cert, i.e. always fiddling with the metadata, so it's impossible to choose the SHA-1 the CA will sign. So even if you find a collision, you won't be able to get a cert issued that lets you exploit it.
For example, maybe I know that sha1("the public key for good.example.com is asdfqwerzxcv and it isn't a CA") = sha1("the public key for evil.example.com is rtyufghjcvbn and it is a CA") = 7d97e98f8af710c7e7fe703abc8f639e0ee507c4 and if I ask a CA to sign the good cert they give me a signature for 7d97e98f8af710c7e7fe703abc8f639e0ee507c4 and I can copy the signature onto the evil cert. With this proposal, the CA would instead only agree to sign "the public key for good.example.com is asdfqwerzxcv and it isn't a CA, and the CA's random number is 994782906" and because I can't control the random number, I can't control the SHA1 of the cert they issue to me.
Unfortunately CAs have a poor track record of complying with their own issuing policies, so some people doubt CAs could be relied on not to mess this up.
[1] https://blog.cloudflare.com/why-its-harder-to-forge-a-sha-1-certificate-than-it-is-to-find-a-sha-1-collision/ https://blog.cloudflare.com/why-its-harder-to-forge-a-sha-1-...
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday_problem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday_problem