3 ms·
Sort of. The point is less primitive and more verifiable. A lot of the security kernels of the past were a decent size. So was Dijkstra's THE OS which pioneered
by nickpsecurity 11y ago
Sort of. The point is less primitive and more verifiable. A lot of the security kernels of the past were a decent size. So was Dijkstra's THE OS which pioneered the robust, construction processes. Hamilton's team's flawless code for Apollo certainly wasn't small either:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/2e/Margaret_Hamilton.gif/220px-Margaret_Hamilton.gif https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/2e/Ma...
We tend to keep the TCB small as less code = less bugs. We simplify it because simpler code = easier verification. Usually... More important is you know what states or execution effects each component can have in a way that can be abstracted into analyzing those above it. So, the thing can be 4Kloc or 100Kloc, but it should be easily analyzed and composed modules.
One problem I noticed, though, is that systems without needed functionality get continuous, ad-hoc versions of that functionality from their developers. C and UNIX were perfect examples with all kinds of extensions there was a mess trying to cover stuff that came by default in prior languages and platforms. So, there was less safety & consistency anyway despite underlying tool being primitive.
This led me to shift from "simple & tiny as possible" to the simplest version of tools that make it as easy as possible to do right. Bernstein et al's Ethos & NaCl projects are perfect examples where internally they're a bit complex but interface is simple to use & securely. Just got to find the right balance.
A lot of good wisdom on such things is from Karger et al in the link below on high assurance virtualization. See "layered design" especially for verbal and visual explanation:
http://www.cse.psu.edu/~trj1/cse543-f06/papers/vax_vmm.pdf http://www.cse.psu.edu/~trj1/cse543-f06/papers/vax_vmm.pdf