4 ms·
Nowadays, as several philosophers at the workshop said, Popperian falsificationism has been supplanted by Bayesian confirmation theory, or Bayesianism
by weinzierl 11y ago
Nowadays, as several philosophers at the workshop said,
Popperian falsificationism has been supplanted by Bayesian
confirmation theory, or Bayesianism, a modern framework
based on the 18th-century probability theory of the English
statistician and minister Thomas Bayes. Bayesianism allows
for the fact that modern scientific theories typically make
claims far beyond what can be directly observed — no one has
ever seen an atom — and so today’s theories often resist a
falsified-unfalsified dichotomy. Instead, trust in a theory
often falls somewhere along a continuum, sliding up or down
between 0 and 100 percent as new information becomes
available. “The Bayesian framework is much more flexible”
than Popper’s theory, said Stephan Hartmann, a Bayesian
philosopher at LMU. “It also connects nicely to the
psychology of reasoning.”
I've never heard of Bayesianism in this context. Is this a serious approach in the philosophy of science?
- dietrichepp 11y agoYes, this is real and it can be done rigorously. The big problem is, "How do we come up with reasonable priors?" It is still a minority position.
- guscost 11y ago> The big problem is, "How do we come up with reasonable priors?" Predictably, as a hardcore supporter of Popper's version, I don't think this problem will be solved.
- eli_gottlieb 11y agoEmpirical Bayes methods (in which the priors come from observed sample data) are a thing.
- yummyfajitas 11y agoYes. It's a fairly natural outgrowth of falsification based theories, and is in fact completely necessary. Consider a simple theory - bear attacks will be very low in the UK forever. Consider an alternate theory - bear attacks will be low until 2016 and then the bearpocalypse happens. Both theories have passed all attempts at falsification - they both accurately predict that bears haven't so far eaten very few people. The Bayesian approach is to assign a prior distribution to various theories of this nature. Because there are infinitely many possible priors, most exceedingly complicated (because the set of priors of complexity < C is finite or at least compact), we'll need to (eventually) assign low probabilities to high complexity ones. This gives a natural derivation of occams razor as well, at least as an asymptotic law. A very readable approach to this is a post by Scott Alexander: http://slatestarcodex.com/2014/09/03/the-guardian-vs-induction/ http://slatestarcodex.com/2014/09/03/the-guardian-vs-inducti... Wikipedia is also pretty good: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_riddle_of_induction https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_riddle_of_induction
- jwmerrill 11y ago> The Bayesian approach is to assign a prior distribution to various theories of this nature. Because there are infinitely many possible priors, most exceedingly complicated (because the set of priors of complexity < C is finite or at least compact), we'll need to (eventually) assign low probabilities to high complexity ones. This gives a natural derivation of occams razor as well, at least as an asymptotic law. I don't think this would be a very compelling argument for Occam's razor if you didn't already believe it. This argument says you can't assign high probability to all "complex" theories, but it doesn't seem to say that the high probability theories must be simple. You could use any criterion at all to single out a high probability subset.
- yummyfajitas 11y agoI didn't claim it did - all I said is that this gives Occams Razor as an asymptotic law. Intuitively, I'm claiming: Lim_{complexity -> infinity} P(theory having fixed complexity) = 0 Stated more precisely, fix a prior distribution, then for any epsilon > 0, I can find a complexity cutoff C (which depends on the prior) so that P(any theory with complexity > C being true) < epsilon. This doesn't mean that P(theory|complexity) is monotonically decreasing, that would be a much stronger claim. I don't know how this isn't a compelling argument, it's a provable mathematical statement.
- jwmerrill 11y agoHere's an argument that runs completely parallel: jwmerrill's razor: points in the plane should be considered to be close to the origin unless there is evidence otherwise. Is this a reasonable law? As reasonable as Occam's razor? I think probably not, but I don't have a strong opinion. One interesting thing to note is that the law doesn't say where the origin is (similarly, Occam's razor is vague about what exactly is meant by "simple" and "complex"). Finite asymptotic form: for any finite point set, there is a distance D such that no point in the set is further from the origin than D. Continuous asymptotic form: given any function from points in the plane to non-negative numbers which has a finite integral, there is a distance D such that the integral of the function over the region that is further from the origin than D is less than any epsilon_1, and such that the function is everywhere less than any epsilon_2 on this region except perhaps on a set of measure 0. The asymptotic forms are provable mathematical statements, but I think it would be a mistake to say that either of them is a very compelling argument for the original statement of "jwmerrill's razor." Without intending to call you out in particular (I don't know what opinions you hold), I think people sometimes accept some odd logic in probability theory that they would be less likely to accept in other contexts. Bayesian probability theory provides practical solutions to a lot of interesting problems, and I personally wish people would emphasize those cases more, and make fewer sweeping statements about it being a consistent theory of all of the scientific method.
- eruditely 11y agohttp://andrewgelman.com/2015/12/17/gathering-of-philosophers-and-physicists-unaware-of-modern-reconciliation-of-bayes-and-popper/ http://andrewgelman.com/2015/12/17/gathering-of-philosophers... Andrew Gelman is the author of the most popular of the advanced "Bayesian Data analysis" text and is considered the standard. He says false, bayesian falsificationism is better than confirmation theory and deborah mayo founder of error statistics essentially agrees with him.
- a_bonobo 11y agoThe linked paper of Gelman is a really good read on Bayesian thinking in philosophy of science: http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/published/philosophy.pdf http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/published/phil...
- eli_gottlieb 11y agoThat sounds like a theorist dodging the issue. The use of Bayesian statistical methods in papers is reasonably normal, although still the minority position. The use of Bayesian falsification or confirmation theory as a philosophy of science is increasingly common. The argument that we should switch to Bayesianism in situations where we cannot sample from the likelihood function (ie: perform an experiment which yields evidence distinguishing one hypothesis from another) is a special kind of bullshit where the attempt at "science" is being packed into prior formation to favor someone's pet theory.
- poelzi 11y agoFalsification has also the problem of unknown unknowns. Something that gave LENR or cold fusion this enormous. setback. They simply did not understand the loading ratio at that time.... A negative replication does not lead to dis-confirmation of a process, only that this particular atomic arrangement did not work.