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I meant rent as the externality, not the property as such. Without the state taking the cost of enforcing the exclusivity the possessor would probably have to
by CuriousSkeptic 11y ago
I meant rent as the externality, not the property as such.
Without the state taking the cost of enforcing the exclusivity the possessor would probably have to invest some cost in securing it. Either buying weapons or entering some kind of contractual agreements.
In either case the cost would probably correlate with the value of property. The rent, then, is the value the possessor can extract from the property as a result of not having to take those costs. In fact, it is the other way around, the cost is distributed among the non-possessors.
Assuming we would like to avoid a situation where possessors have to invest in violent means of exclusivity, I argue that the states role should be to enforce propery as, fair, contractual agreements between possessor and non-possessors.
- vezzy-fnord 11y agoThe rent, then, is the value the possessor can extract from the property as a result of not having to take those costs. But the nature of uncertainty of action means that such a cost isn't really quantifiable. It seems like you're trying to say that the rent is the value derived during idling. But idling can serve a valid social purpose in conferring availability of something, or when land is converted for a purpose only on occasion but must necessarily remain available by idling.
- CuriousSkeptic 11y agoI think it is quantifiable. One way to quantify it is to determine exactly how much you are prepared to pay to keep the tile, (or some else is to get it). A possibly fairer way might be to let you pay what the next highest bidder is prepared to pay. That means you unique addition remains your profit, while also quantifying the opportunity cost instead. Regarding idling, I'm not arguing against that, only against the system by how it's scheduled and who pays and who gets paid for it