4 ms·

we can't just decide that property rights can be ignored when they're cheap to exploit (like copyright or patent infringement) Copyrights and patents are state

we can't just decide that property rights can be ignored when they're cheap to exploit (like copyright or patent infringement) Copyrights and patents are state-granted exclusionary privileges, not property titles. If you want to improve wealth distribution, messing with the mechanics of how things are bought and sold, as always, isn't going to get you very far. What are you talking about? Abolishing and reforming institutions is one of the most powerful tools there is. Maybe just raise taxes, you know? The whole point of this paper is that simplistic fiscal shenanigans like this don't work.

CuriousSkeptic 11y ago
I used to argue against conflating property and immaterial rights along those lines. But it gets kind of interesting if you realize that all property titles are state-granted exclusionary privileges. So the distinction might not be that important. When John Locke argued for the moral right of property as a result of labor, he also argued that it only applies when there are an abundance of resources. An extension of that though could be, why not look at all rent generating propert with suspicion. Property rents, as a result of exclusive rights to scarce resources, could be seen as an externality, as a result of everybody else accepting those exclusive rights without compensation for being excluded.
- vezzy-fnord 11y ago
  But it gets kind of interesting if you realize that all property titles are state-granted exclusionary privileges. Insofar as current arrangements of a state holding eminent domain, yes. Not intrinsically. Property rents, as a result of exclusive rights to scarce resources, could be seen as an externality, as a result of everybody else accepting those exclusive rights without compensation for being excluded. A property owner may extend easement or some other non-possessory right to usage, so to immediately classify all property as an "externality" is flat out wrong. If anything, private property rights are a necessary (if not the primary) precondition to resolving externalities.
  - CuriousSkeptic 11y ago
    I meant rent as the externality, not the property as such. Without the state taking the cost of enforcing the exclusivity the possessor would probably have to invest some cost in securing it. Either buying weapons or entering some kind of contractual agreements. In either case the cost would probably correlate with the value of property. The rent, then, is the value the possessor can extract from the property as a result of not having to take those costs. In fact, it is the other way around, the cost is distributed among the non-possessors. Assuming we would like to avoid a situation where possessors have to invest in violent means of exclusivity, I argue that the states role should be to enforce propery as, fair, contractual agreements between possessor and non-possessors.
    - vezzy-fnord 11y ago
      The rent, then, is the value the possessor can extract from the property as a result of not having to take those costs. But the nature of uncertainty of action means that such a cost isn't really quantifiable. It seems like you're trying to say that the rent is the value derived during idling. But idling can serve a valid social purpose in conferring availability of something, or when land is converted for a purpose only on occasion but must necessarily remain available by idling.
      - CuriousSkeptic 11y ago
        I think it is quantifiable. One way to quantify it is to determine exactly how much you are prepared to pay to keep the tile, (or some else is to get it). A possibly fairer way might be to let you pay what the next highest bidder is prepared to pay. That means you unique addition remains your profit, while also quantifying the opportunity cost instead. Regarding idling, I'm not arguing against that, only against the system by how it's scheduled and who pays and who gets paid for it
  - dragonwriter 11y ago
    > Insofar as current arrangements of a state holding eminent domain, yes. Not intrinsically. No, property rights are intrinsically a creation of government through law, whether or not the government reserves something like the power of eminent domain.
- humanrebar 11y ago
  > So the distinction might not be that important. If you take someone's home, they are homeless. If you copy someone's cat video, they still have their copy to enjoy. That's a huge distinction.
  - CuriousSkeptic 11y ago
    But that really have nothing to do with the distinction between material an immaterial property. The distinction lies in the moral judgment of the consequences, and fairness, of those actions.
    - humanrebar 11y ago
      No, it has everything to do with material and immaterial property. Because of the laws of conservation of mass, you cannot get new things for nothing. You can take things, and you can build new things. You can't out-and-out Star Trek style replicate things, at least not yet. Information, because it isn't matter, can be copied very easily. It's actually quite tricky to make sure that only one person has a piece of information. This is why bitcoin and block chains are technically interesting. All of this impacts the consequences and morality of the two kinds of "stealing". Stealing matter necessarily harms someone. They just lost something. Even if things can be easily replaced, the identity of matter is important. I could go out and buy another birthday card just like the one on my desk, but I'll never be able to truly replace it because my grandpa gave it to me just before he died. On the other hand, the identity of an instance of data generally isn't important. If I lose a video of my grandpa and then acquire a different copy, it isn't that important.

CuriousSkeptic 11y ago

I used to argue against conflating property and immaterial rights along those lines. But it gets kind of interesting if you realize that all property titles are state-granted exclusionary privileges. So the distinction might not be that important. When John Locke argued for the moral right of property as a result of labor, he also argued that it only applies when there are an abundance of resources. An extension of that though could be, why not look at all rent generating propert with suspicion. Property rents, as a result of exclusive rights to scarce resources, could be seen as an externality, as a result of everybody else accepting those exclusive rights without compensation for being excluded.

vezzy-fnord 11y ago
But it gets kind of interesting if you realize that all property titles are state-granted exclusionary privileges. Insofar as current arrangements of a state holding eminent domain, yes. Not intrinsically. Property rents, as a result of exclusive rights to scarce resources, could be seen as an externality, as a result of everybody else accepting those exclusive rights without compensation for being excluded. A property owner may extend easement or some other non-possessory right to usage, so to immediately classify all property as an "externality" is flat out wrong. If anything, private property rights are a necessary (if not the primary) precondition to resolving externalities.
- CuriousSkeptic 11y ago
  I meant rent as the externality, not the property as such. Without the state taking the cost of enforcing the exclusivity the possessor would probably have to invest some cost in securing it. Either buying weapons or entering some kind of contractual agreements. In either case the cost would probably correlate with the value of property. The rent, then, is the value the possessor can extract from the property as a result of not having to take those costs. In fact, it is the other way around, the cost is distributed among the non-possessors. Assuming we would like to avoid a situation where possessors have to invest in violent means of exclusivity, I argue that the states role should be to enforce propery as, fair, contractual agreements between possessor and non-possessors.
  - vezzy-fnord 11y ago
    The rent, then, is the value the possessor can extract from the property as a result of not having to take those costs. But the nature of uncertainty of action means that such a cost isn't really quantifiable. It seems like you're trying to say that the rent is the value derived during idling. But idling can serve a valid social purpose in conferring availability of something, or when land is converted for a purpose only on occasion but must necessarily remain available by idling.
    - CuriousSkeptic 11y ago
      I think it is quantifiable. One way to quantify it is to determine exactly how much you are prepared to pay to keep the tile, (or some else is to get it). A possibly fairer way might be to let you pay what the next highest bidder is prepared to pay. That means you unique addition remains your profit, while also quantifying the opportunity cost instead. Regarding idling, I'm not arguing against that, only against the system by how it's scheduled and who pays and who gets paid for it
- dragonwriter 11y ago
  > Insofar as current arrangements of a state holding eminent domain, yes. Not intrinsically. No, property rights are intrinsically a creation of government through law, whether or not the government reserves something like the power of eminent domain.
humanrebar 11y ago
> So the distinction might not be that important. If you take someone's home, they are homeless. If you copy someone's cat video, they still have their copy to enjoy. That's a huge distinction.
- CuriousSkeptic 11y ago
  But that really have nothing to do with the distinction between material an immaterial property. The distinction lies in the moral judgment of the consequences, and fairness, of those actions.
  - humanrebar 11y ago
    No, it has everything to do with material and immaterial property. Because of the laws of conservation of mass, you cannot get new things for nothing. You can take things, and you can build new things. You can't out-and-out Star Trek style replicate things, at least not yet. Information, because it isn't matter, can be copied very easily. It's actually quite tricky to make sure that only one person has a piece of information. This is why bitcoin and block chains are technically interesting. All of this impacts the consequences and morality of the two kinds of "stealing". Stealing matter necessarily harms someone. They just lost something. Even if things can be easily replaced, the identity of matter is important. I could go out and buy another birthday card just like the one on my desk, but I'll never be able to truly replace it because my grandpa gave it to me just before he died. On the other hand, the identity of an instance of data generally isn't important. If I lose a video of my grandpa and then acquire a different copy, it isn't that important.