I mentioned your first link, the factoring of a 768-bit RSA key, in my first comment. RSA isn't a "broken encryption scheme": it's a perfectly fine one. It's j

I mentioned your first link, the factoring of a 768-bit RSA key, in my first comment. RSA isn't a "broken encryption scheme": it's a perfectly fine one. It's just that you need to use key lengths long enough to defend against the computing power available to current and expected adversaries. That paper is just a demonstration of modern computing power, which just shows that you should use longer keys. I took his statement of "Only in some broken encryption schemes" to be a misunderstood reference to stuff like this: http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/10/how-the-nsa-can-break-trillions-of-encrypted-web-and-vpn-connections/ http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/10/how-the-nsa-can-brea... or a side channel attack. Your second link has garbage sensationalized headline. It actually describes a side channel attack that has nothing to do with cryptography algorithms. It's basically equivalent to a clever way of looking over someone's shoulder.