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Facebook's proposal is that only organizations that are a) demonstrably using this technique and b) validated at a higher level than automatic domain validation
by geofft 11y ago
Facebook's proposal is that only organizations that are a) demonstrably using this technique and b) validated at a higher level than automatic domain validation be allowed to get new SHA-1 certs. This means that an attacker will have to identify themselves fairly strongly in order to conduct a collision attack. It is a vast improvement from anyone being able to register a random new domain name and get a SHA-1 cert for it. It's probably not a huge roadblock for a superpower's well-funded intelligence agency, but I think that the threat model is not primarily about protecting against them.
I agree about the political part of the issue, but on the other hand, the SHA-1 deprecation is one of the most proactive things the CA/Browser Forum has done. Having it go not quite perfectly is still a vast improvement from reactively deprecating things only when they are fully insecure.
- agwa 11y ago> Facebook's proposal is that only organizations that are a) demonstrably using this technique and b) validated at a higher level than automatic domain validation be allowed to get new SHA-1 certs b) may help prevent collision attacks, but I have a hard time viewing a) (requiring downgrade-proof cert switching) as anything but security theater. Edit: it's not even clear to me that b) is an integral part of Facebook's proposal. Their blog post says (emphasis added): "Such verification can be automated or manual, and appropriate measures can be put in place to reduce the risk of a collision attack. Those protections could include requiring LV applicants to have already passed OV or EV verification" [https://www.facebook.com/notes/alex-stamos/the-sha-1-sunset/10153782990367929 https://www.facebook.com/notes/alex-stamos/the-sha-1-sunset/...] CloudFlare's blog post [https://blog.cloudflare.com/sha-1-deprecation-no-browser-left-behind/ https://blog.cloudflare.com/sha-1-deprecation-no-browser-lef...] doesn't mention it at all.
- geofft 11y agoYeah, I agree that this should be manual, subject to significant checks, and rare, and without that we've effectively extended the SHA-1 collision cutoff date. (Another worthwhile check might be to require that it be an exact renewal - same key and names - of an existing cert, signed before the proposal.)