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Jacques, the previous date is based on this document from 1998 ( http://www.transportenvironment.org/sites/te/files/media/T&E%2098-3_0.pdf http://www.transporte

Jacques, the previous date is based on this document from 1998 ( http://www.transportenvironment.org/sites/te/files/media/T&E%2098-3_0.pdf http://www.transportenvironment.org/sites/te/files/media/T&E... ), which states: "Car manufacturers can use modem electronic equipment to adapt the engine to any type of test cycle. They can even tell the computer of the car how to recognise when the car is being driven according to a specific test-cycle and adjust the combustion accordingly. It was this kind of software that six truck manufacturers, including two European firms (Volvo and Renault), recently used in the United States to defeat the EPA's pollution control. As a result emissions of nitrogen oxides from highway driving increased by 300 per cent. "

jacquesm 11y ago
That takes this from 'damning' right into 'criminal' territory. Wow. That document should get a lot more visibility. I will update the article to include your link.
- Terretta 11y ago
  Not comfortable with this "don't blame the engineers" angle, which sounds like some developers are taking the fall for execs. We are talking about engineers, yes, but, guys like the research and development chiefs of Audi and Porsche, Ulrich Hackenberg and Wolfgang Hatz, or Hanno Jelden, head of the company's powertrain electronics. These guys are top execs. Likely substantial performance incentive packages. Such execs, like any CTO anywhere, could run a "special project" like this off the radar, to hit projected metrics, and bonus targets. Don't take VW's word for it, here is the German prosecutor's take: > The number of Volkswagen employees that orchestrated the diesel-emissions scandal that's rocked the automotive industry was likely fewer than 10, according to the public prosecutor's office in Braunschweig, Germany. http://www.autoblog.com/2015/10/23/fewer-than-10-vw-engineers-may-have-been-involved-in-diesel-defe/ http://www.autoblog.com/2015/10/23/fewer-than-10-vw-engineer... Often we engineers know things the CEO doesn't. I'm confident that happens across industries.
  - nitrogen 11y ago
    When Kirk says "more power" and Scotty says "you cannot change the laws of physics", maybe Kirk should listen. But instead Scotty is forced to do something unsafe. This is a metaphor for any engineering department given unrealistic performance targets. Engineers find solutions, so make sure they are targeted at the right problems.
  - jacquesm 11y ago
    Over the course of my career 3 times someone wanted me to do something illegal. All of those times I handed in my walking papers. In one case I was asked to directly do something that would cause me to be acting in an illegal way, in two of the cases it would result in a company doing something that was illegal. Yes, CTO's can run a 'special project' but the engineers are quite aware of the situation with respect to emission targets in this specific case and must have been very much aware that they were doing something that was fraudulent. The people mentioned there certainly had incentives but did not have VW in their pocket to such an extent that they could interpret their mandate as carte-blanche to commit fraud. These are not stupid people, on the contrary. My interpretation is that they were told to do this 'in whatever way possible' and that they interpreted this possibly as 'and that includes illegal but don't tell me about it'. Plausible deniability are the key words. Whether that's the case or not will come out in due time, it always does. See Oliver North, Watergate and countless other scandals where you can only throw so many people under the bus until someone does a tell-all. I note that the prosecutor hedges his words carefully ('likely' and 'orchestrated') and I also note that on the VW org chart it would not take more than 10 people to go from the CEO level all the way to a single programmer to insert this code. That would also still require someone to either cooperate with this scheme at the auditors side, especially given the nature of the Bosch memo and the document linked by user PeterStuer which you may take as common knowledge within the automotive industry. In such circumstances a source code level audit of the software that ends up in the shipping devices to make sure everything is above board would seem to be indicated at a minimum.
    - softyeti 11y ago
      That is the right way to handle the situation. These engineers work in such a specialized environment, I wonder how that would work out for them.
- xixi77 11y ago
  Just looked at it briefly, but it seems to be about the European test cycle not covering all driving conditions -- to my knowledge, this is something that has been the case for a LONG time, and all manufacturers as well as regulators are well aware of this. Vehicles are designed to conform to the specific standards, and the test procedure is just as much a part of the standard as the actual measurement at the pipe. US VW scandal is about going way further than just designing the vehicle to satisfy a specific test -- it actively detects that it is being tested and adjusts operation. It's one thing to, say, not try to optimize emissions while towing another vehicle if the standard does not measure emissions during towing, and quite another to cheat on a test that does.
  - jacquesm 11y ago
    The article specifically addresses the 'test detection' and adjustment feature. See the quoted passage above.
    - xixi77 11y ago
      That passage just refers to a well-known truck cheating incident (iirc a few US companies were caught doing this at one time too) -- it certainly does not imply that such cheating is an accepted practice at time of writing. It just makes a point that a better-designed test would be trickier to cheat in that way, in addition to being more representative of driving conditions.
      - jacquesm 11y ago
        No, but it is a published document that likely figures as required reading in the offices of those that are tasked with ensuring that such tricks don't pass out the manufacturing door given the possible penalties. In other words: actively look for defeat devices in software (that's real work but it is doable) and get the engineers involved to state very explicitly that no such devices have been implemented.
deleted 11y ago
[deleted]
- PeterStuer 11y ago
  It was a second reply to the OP, not meant to be reply to my own first remark.

jacquesm 11y ago

That takes this from 'damning' right into 'criminal' territory. Wow. That document should get a lot more visibility. I will update the article to include your link.

Terretta 11y ago
Not comfortable with this "don't blame the engineers" angle, which sounds like some developers are taking the fall for execs. We are talking about engineers, yes, but, guys like the research and development chiefs of Audi and Porsche, Ulrich Hackenberg and Wolfgang Hatz, or Hanno Jelden, head of the company's powertrain electronics. These guys are top execs. Likely substantial performance incentive packages. Such execs, like any CTO anywhere, could run a "special project" like this off the radar, to hit projected metrics, and bonus targets. Don't take VW's word for it, here is the German prosecutor's take: > The number of Volkswagen employees that orchestrated the diesel-emissions scandal that's rocked the automotive industry was likely fewer than 10, according to the public prosecutor's office in Braunschweig, Germany. http://www.autoblog.com/2015/10/23/fewer-than-10-vw-engineers-may-have-been-involved-in-diesel-defe/ http://www.autoblog.com/2015/10/23/fewer-than-10-vw-engineer... Often we engineers know things the CEO doesn't. I'm confident that happens across industries.
- nitrogen 11y ago
  When Kirk says "more power" and Scotty says "you cannot change the laws of physics", maybe Kirk should listen. But instead Scotty is forced to do something unsafe. This is a metaphor for any engineering department given unrealistic performance targets. Engineers find solutions, so make sure they are targeted at the right problems.
- jacquesm 11y ago
  Over the course of my career 3 times someone wanted me to do something illegal. All of those times I handed in my walking papers. In one case I was asked to directly do something that would cause me to be acting in an illegal way, in two of the cases it would result in a company doing something that was illegal. Yes, CTO's can run a 'special project' but the engineers are quite aware of the situation with respect to emission targets in this specific case and must have been very much aware that they were doing something that was fraudulent. The people mentioned there certainly had incentives but did not have VW in their pocket to such an extent that they could interpret their mandate as carte-blanche to commit fraud. These are not stupid people, on the contrary. My interpretation is that they were told to do this 'in whatever way possible' and that they interpreted this possibly as 'and that includes illegal but don't tell me about it'. Plausible deniability are the key words. Whether that's the case or not will come out in due time, it always does. See Oliver North, Watergate and countless other scandals where you can only throw so many people under the bus until someone does a tell-all. I note that the prosecutor hedges his words carefully ('likely' and 'orchestrated') and I also note that on the VW org chart it would not take more than 10 people to go from the CEO level all the way to a single programmer to insert this code. That would also still require someone to either cooperate with this scheme at the auditors side, especially given the nature of the Bosch memo and the document linked by user PeterStuer which you may take as common knowledge within the automotive industry. In such circumstances a source code level audit of the software that ends up in the shipping devices to make sure everything is above board would seem to be indicated at a minimum.
  - softyeti 11y ago
    That is the right way to handle the situation. These engineers work in such a specialized environment, I wonder how that would work out for them.
xixi77 11y ago
Just looked at it briefly, but it seems to be about the European test cycle not covering all driving conditions -- to my knowledge, this is something that has been the case for a LONG time, and all manufacturers as well as regulators are well aware of this. Vehicles are designed to conform to the specific standards, and the test procedure is just as much a part of the standard as the actual measurement at the pipe. US VW scandal is about going way further than just designing the vehicle to satisfy a specific test -- it actively detects that it is being tested and adjusts operation. It's one thing to, say, not try to optimize emissions while towing another vehicle if the standard does not measure emissions during towing, and quite another to cheat on a test that does.
- jacquesm 11y ago
  The article specifically addresses the 'test detection' and adjustment feature. See the quoted passage above.
  - xixi77 11y ago
    That passage just refers to a well-known truck cheating incident (iirc a few US companies were caught doing this at one time too) -- it certainly does not imply that such cheating is an accepted practice at time of writing. It just makes a point that a better-designed test would be trickier to cheat in that way, in addition to being more representative of driving conditions.
    - jacquesm 11y ago
      No, but it is a published document that likely figures as required reading in the offices of those that are tasked with ensuring that such tricks don't pass out the manufacturing door given the possible penalties. In other words: actively look for defeat devices in software (that's real work but it is doable) and get the engineers involved to state very explicitly that no such devices have been implemented.

deleted 11y ago

[deleted]

PeterStuer 11y ago
It was a second reply to the OP, not meant to be reply to my own first remark.