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TPP Threatens Security and Safety by Locking Down US Policy on Source Code Audit
- tzs 11y agoThe Software Freedom Law Center published an analysis of these provisions a couple weeks ago [1], and they didn't find any serious problems with them. [1] https://www.softwarefreedom.org/blog/2015/nov/23/TPP-Article-14/ https://www.softwarefreedom.org/blog/2015/nov/23/TPP-Article...
- pdonis 11y agoTheir analysis looks to me to be directed at a different issue: the question of whether TPP outlaws free and open source software, period. I agree with them that it doesn't; but that's not what the EFF is worried about. They're worried about the fact that, under TPP, the US government will have no way to force vendors of components like routers to reveal their source code to anyone--even government regulators. The SFLC analysis does not appear to me to address that issue.
- dnial02 11y agoI think the clause is there because China start to ask Tech company to open their source code if they want to do business there[0]. Which make me wonder, how do you distinguish between legitimate use of source code audit and the one that try to blatantly copy the source code? [0] http://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/telecom/security/chinas-new-rules-ask-tech-firms-to-hand-over-source-code http://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/telecom/security/chinas-n...
- Absentinsomniac 11y agoI wonder if a trusted third party auditor agreed upon by both parties could work.
- dnial02 11y agoIt might work, but it will be another barrier of entry.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- SXX 11y agoDo you seriously think that TPP going to stop China from stealing tech if they decide to actually use it stolen source code like that? Come on. Source code audit is pretty standard procedure in case of any government usage around the globe and there also plenty of people have access to proprietary software source directly or not. Even big companies getting hacked by enthusiast with nearly zero budget and country have almost unlimited resources. What's more important so far China was doing great just replacing exist products using hardware available on market and without copying anyone source code.
- dnial02 11y agoThe idea is that source code audit will not be the barrier of import. If the government request foreign company for source code audit they need to ask nicely, not with threat of banning import and sales of said product.
- raquo 11y agoSo when the TPP says: > No Party shall require the transfer of, or access to, source code of software owned by a person of another Party, as a condition for the import, distribution, sale or use of such software, or of products containing such software, in its territory. This means that requiring code audits is not allowed for any software, not just imported software, right? Because I've seen quite a few people misled into thinking that similarly worded provisions apply only to imported goods. If TPP was a legit trade treaty I would expect it to have anti-protectionism provisions (i.e. treating imported and home-produced software the same), not legislation-preventing ones. One provision like that is disturbing, 6000 pages of them is horrifying.
- wavefunction 11y agoWhere do you see "imported" in that legal language? "Misled" or willfully ignorant? The second, of course.
- raquo 11y agoIt's right there, "condition for the import". The text in question is just one sentence, but its meaning can be altered by any of the other 6000 pages. For example, this is how people who know more about this than me are reading it: http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/11/24/tpp-article-14-17-free-software-no-harm-no-foul/ http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/11/24/tpp-article-14-17-free-so... Seriously, you can't blame ordinary people that they don't want to perform legal analysis of such a huge treaty as TPP, even if you somehow think they are able to.
- sukulaku 11y ago> If TPP was a legit trade treaty I would expect it to have anti-protectionism provisions Indeed. An actual free-trade agreement would be really simple to implement. Just stop intervening in trade in any way, and you'll have Free Trade. But that would be against a lot of cronies' interests and very much in the people's interests, so it's never going to happen. On a related note: Stop intervening in what people do with their property, and you'll have a free market. That would preclude taxation though, and so, a lot of people who believe they somehow benefit from someone forcefully taking their money would object.
- tedunangst 11y agoDoes TPP prevent the US from adopting a policy of preferring open source in the bidding process?
- olefoo 11y agoOne could make the argument that a government bidding process that expressed such a requirement was an administrative rule that prevented parties from selling or distributing their software. Given that the arbitration procedure outlined by the TPP is operated by private lawyers who are already unreasonably biased towards their corporate clients... The entire treaty strikes me as a brazen giveaway of national sovereignty to private interests. And as such should be stopped.
- tedunangst 11y agoI was thinking of policies such as preferring "minority owned" businesses, which don't strictly prevent other companies from competing.
- maxerickson 11y agoCountries can withdraw from the treaty at any time. This complicates the argument that they are giving away any sovereignty. Sovereignty is more about where final power rests, not about where immediate control happens to take place, so I think withdrawal is a useful counterpoint to concerns about giving up sovereignty.
- lucio 11y ago4th amendment Threatens Security and Safety by Locking Down US Policy on Terrorist Information Retrieval (the onion)
- dguido 11y agoAs far as I can tell, this prevents countries from demanding source code to a closed source product as a condition for selling into a country. Seams reasonable? If you want to audit a closed-source program for bugs and backdoors, people have been able to do this successfully hundreds (of thousands?) of times with standard tools like debuggers, disassemblers, and automated program analysis tools. The fact that a program is closed source has not stopped anyone from researching how it works. Ask ANY security researcher if it suddenly becomes impossible. EFF for the win, again! Who the heck is advising these people?
- iamsohungry 11y ago> As far as I can tell, this prevents countries from demanding source code to a closed source product as a condition for selling into a country. Seams reasonable? How could this possibly be reasonable? Being able to look at the source code is a huge part of regulating code in life-and-death applications. Medical devices, cars, planes, train systems, etc. all need to be held to safety standards, and not allowing regulators access to the source code significantly inhibits their ability to do their job. > If you want to audit a closed-source program for bugs and backdoors, people have been able to do this successfully hundreds (of thousands?) of times with standard tools like debuggers, disassemblers, and automated program analysis tools. The fact that a program is closed source has not stopped anyone from researching how it works. Ask ANY security researcher if it suddenly becomes impossible. First of all, there are cases where you're just flat wrong. The Gauss virus contains an encrypted payload which is encrypted with a few system strings, meaning that when it runs in that system it will execute the encrypted code. It's impossible to audit the encrypted code without knowing the properties of the system it's intended to run on. Admittedly this is currently an unusual case, but given the incentives, it's unlikely that this will remain unusual. Hiding proof of code like the code in the Volkswagen emissions scandal[2] presents a large barrier to regulation, and it's not hard to imagine cases where it would make proving wrongdoing outright impossible. Even in cases where an encrypted payload is not used, you cannot in good faith argue that the capability of auditing a binary is equivalent to the capability of auditing the source code. Yes, it's possible in most cases, but obviously it's significantly harder to audit computer generated, optimized, and decompiled assembly code than it is to audit code written in, say, C. The skill and time required to audit a binary is such that it's cost prohibitive in most cases: in the Volkswagen case, they discovered the fraudulent code with a $50,000 study that white-box tested the code by driving the car.[3] My guess is that an audit of the C code could have revealed something like: if(car_is_being_emissions_tested()) { ... } ...and such an audit could have been done by a junior in college working at a $15/hour internship. As these ways to cheat regulation become more sophisticated, under-funded regulatory agencies will be unable to keep up. It may be mathematically possible to audit binaries effectively, but it's not monetarily or organizationally an effective way to do regulation. In short, it's absolutely not reasonable to tie the hands of regulators by preventing them access to the source code. Doing so is equivalent giving up on regulating a large fraction of possible anti-regulation behaviors. And this is only talking about regulation, when the binary being audited is produced by a company trying to skirt regulation. Even more concerns arise when the binary being audited might be partially created by a government. The NSA has well-known capabilities in this area, and we have no reason to believe that China (where many devices in the US are manufactured) has similar capabilities or will in the near future. [1] https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/33561/the-mystery-of-the-encrypted-gauss-payload-5/ https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/33561/the-mystery-of-t... [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volkswagen_emissions_scandal https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volkswagen_emissions_scandal [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volkswagen_emissions_scandal#U.S._testing_conducted https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volkswagen_emissions_scandal#U...
- rbobby 11y agoI'm of two minds on this provision. First is that I'm very uncertain that it is a good idea to allow a gov't regulatory agency to require access to source code as a condition of access to a marketplace. Especially if it is anything more than simple access, like some form of auditing. Who's going to pay for whatever the regulatory agency is doing with the code (most likely the code's owner)? Also how long is it going to take the agency to issue an authorization? How would this impact code delivered to web browsers? Especially something packaged up as a webassembly or native plugin? So... any new regulatory body that requires the ability to examine source code seems like it would need to navigate a minefield of problems. I doubt that a gov't agency could strike the right balance, and the side effect would be a significant barriers to trading in software. On the other hand, the recent spat of problems with automobile software (Volkswagen, Toyota) do seem to make the case that some regulatory action might be necessary. Certainly requiring source code access is not that unusual in court cases, but do we want to wait until these companies are getting sued? Also with the expectation that driverless cars are coming... well.. there's going to be a lot of safety concerns there. On the gripping hand, the FDA's medical device regulations seem to handle the issue of software without requiring access to source code (http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm085281.htm http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm085281...). The TPP doesn't prevent any sort of validation regime requirement for products containing software... so maybe that's the right approach for specific product types (life critical, security critical... though what about browsers?). The TPP also doesn't prevent source code access via a suit or enforcement action, so if a problem does appear an appropriate regulatory body could demand source code (eg. NTSB could take an enforcement action of "validation audit" which requires the validation records and associated source code). So... yet another part of the TPP that I'm conflicted on... sigh.
- Zigurd 11y agoIt's pretty brazen: Now that we know for certain that US intelligence agencies buy and/or coerce US technology providers to install back doors, we shove a treaty through that globally prevents looking for those back doors. Nice.