4 ms·
And everyone made fun of Netflix for implementing a secure protocol on top of http. Suddenly that seems really useful for people in Kazakhstan. http://techblo
by jedberg 11y ago
And everyone made fun of Netflix for implementing a secure protocol on top of http. Suddenly that seems really useful for people in Kazakhstan.
http://techblog.netflix.com/2014/10/message-security-layer-modern-take-on.html http://techblog.netflix.com/2014/10/message-security-layer-m...
https://github.com/Netflix/msl https://github.com/Netflix/msl
- tptacek 11y agoIf the protocol is delivered over HTTP and runs in Javascript DOM context, it will be straightforward for an adversary that MITMs all traffic to defeat it.
- klapinat0r 11y agoCurious. How do you go about (trivially) defeating asymmetric encryption? EDIT: or do you mean to replace "all" (content + js)?
- venomsnake 11y agoNo, just inject some JS that reads the required keys.
- klapinat0r 11y agoOkay, so it's (just) for reading the delivered data. Somehow I keep considering MitM a harmful attack (i.e. manipulating the data before it hits the user). My bad :)
- angelbob 11y agoCan do that through injected JS as well.
- MatthaeusHarris 11y agoGiven that you're relying on server-provided JS to verify the integrity of the data in the first place, a MITM could replace the verification function with return(true) and then inject whatever data they want.
- jedberg 11y agoYes, you'd have to sideload the initial keys/code, presumably outside the country. It works for Netflix because it's baked into the client. But at least once you've somehow gotten the keys you won't get stopped by the government blocking it since it isn't 'https' and doesn't look like 'https'. Until they figure it out and start blocking that too of course.
- exelius 11y agoPretty sure that Netflix loads a Flash client (or some other trusted code module) to prevent this. But you're right; the browser isn't secure enough to enable client-side encryption over HTTP as it would be trivial to MITM and sideload JS code to defeat it.
- iofj 11y agoThat's the problem with "client-side encryption". It doesn't work because the provider also has the power to replace the code with no say from you. And it's not very detectible because they do it all the time.
- kuschku 11y agoIt’s the same reason why any DRM is completely pointless: It only provides inconvenience for the legitimate user. I own Anno 2070 (as can be seen on my steam profile), but can only play with RELOADED crack under wine because UPlay refuses to run. Same with this type of encryption: Kazahstan can easily defeat it, but it makes it harder for people trying to debug why they can’t use Netflix (for example, in case that Kazahstan MitM's everything, and encrypts with a different certificate than your Netflix client is using).
- pdkl95 11y agoClient side encryption works just fine. It's only a problem in a browser where you have to download the possibly-MitM'd program each time you want to use it. Actual installed client software that encrypts end-to-end is the proper way to use encryption. One catch: remember that the browser itself absolutely should not be the installed program doing the end-to-end encryption, where bugs can allow the private keys to be leaked. Important data like the private keys shouldn't even be in the same address space. See gpg-agent/ssh-agent as an examples of how to keep sensitive data in a separate process.
- tptacek 11y agoNit: you are effectively re-downloading browser DOM JS crypto programs every time your browser loads a new DOM element for the page hosting the app. It's not just something that happens when you first visit the site. That's one of the things that makes securing browser JS crypto so intractable.
- aaronkrolik 11y agoIf the js asset cant be trusted, what would stop an adversary from mitm-ing the application level implementation?
- gohrt 11y agoUntil next week when GFWoKazhakhstan blocks all traffic using the Netflix protocol. Unless the traffic is steganographically hidden, uncontrollable traffic will be simply killed.