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The "security by obscurity" bit is interesting. I'm now imagining a server where it checks that the initial sequence number of the SYN packet ends with your cur
by geofft 11y ago
The "security by obscurity" bit is interesting. I'm now imagining a server where it checks that the initial sequence number of the SYN packet ends with your current OATH two-factor authentication code, or something, and it drops the packet if you have the wrong code. (Which elevates it quite a bit past simply "obscurity.") The traffic is indistinguishable from normal SSH traffic, and there's very little code that has to process anything from untrusted sources.
- alan5 11y agoWhile not quite to the same level of obfuscation, your suggestion reminded me of this project: http://www.cipherdyne.org/fwknop/ http://www.cipherdyne.org/fwknop/ Its essentially port knocking with a single encrypted packet. Haven't tried it (yet) myself but sounds interesting.
- rando289 11y agoSee fwknop and the history of port knocking.
- michaelrash 11y agoSome information on this is located in the fwknop tutorial: http://www.cipherdyne.org/fwknop/docs/fwknop-tutorial.html http://www.cipherdyne.org/fwknop/docs/fwknop-tutorial.html
- Natsu 11y agoI just hope that anyone doing that only does it with private networks. I still remember that painful time I had to debut the fact that someone was blocking the heartbeat TLS extension by simply dropping traffic and I had a product that most of the time sent that extension by default ("everything else can connect, so it's clearly your fault that you cannot"). I also hope that said network actually patched Heartbleed, but I sincerely wonder about that.