2 ms·
> All the same, people seem to wish that servers could say to clients, “Here are my expected keys, and you should fail to connect to me if I seem to present dif
by shkkmo 11y ago
> All the same, people seem to wish that servers could say to clients, “Here are my expected keys, and you should fail to connect to me if I seem to present different keys, even if the person who owns the computer wants to connect anyway.” That would be beneficial in that non-consensual proxying would be exposed sooner and with somewhat more certainty. But if a server could get such a guarantee, it could also be used in ways very much counter to the open Internet we know and love..
Thus putting up a warning when the pinned cert is being overriden:
1) Does not prevent all instances of non-consensual proxying, but
2) Allows better discovery of some instances of non-consensual proxying, and
3) Makes semi-consensual proxying (e.g. antiviruses, corporate firewalls) visible to the average user unless the proxier explicitly takes steps to hide the warning.
4) Does not allow the servers to force clients to use a specific key.
Wouldn't this solve all the relevant issues?