3 ms·
To reiterate, because you missed my original point: The author thinks we're doing okay at security, and capabilities failed. We aren't doing okay at security, a
by bascule 11y ago
To reiterate, because you missed my original point: The author thinks we're doing okay at security, and capabilities failed. We aren't doing okay at security, and capabilities are still a promising solution.
The solutions where capabilities are truly most promising have no embedded competitors. I'm looking at things like SELinux here. Few other solutions (except e.g. Macaroons) are actually capable of making correct authorization decisions in scenarios involving 3+ principals: the competition is broken, and vicariously, so are most authorization systems which try to solve 3+ principal authorization problem correctly.
You may as well be arguing that memory safe / garbage collected languages lost to C circa 1995. C is broken and programs written in C will always be full of holes as compared to equivalent programs in memory safe languages just in the same way as authorization systems not built to handle 3+ principals will make wrong decisions. This is why it's 2015 and we're still dealing with CSRF.
If you implement SELinux at your job like I do, and have some informed criticism about how Capsicum is unneeded because SELinux is great, I'd love to hear it! But I'm guessing that isn't the case... I am also guessing it's an area the OP is not particularly informed about.
- pron 11y ago> you missed my original point I think you have simply misunderstood what the author is actually saying. He is not saying what you think he is, and I don't think you disagree with him at all. > The author thinks we're doing okay at security Where does he say that? He says, "security still isn’t a first class concern for most programmers", and puts it in the "No" column. > capabilities are still a promising solution. The author doesn't dispute that. In fact, he says nothing about the promise certain technologies hold. In fact, he says: "I’m much more optimistic about research areas that haven’t yielded much real-world impact (yet), like capability based computing and fancy type systems. It seems basically impossible to predict what areas will become valuable over the next thirty years." The article, however, is not concerned with possible solutions, even those that show great promise. It is only and solely concerned with solutions that have been conclusively shown to work well in the field by having a wide applicability and usage in numerous production projects. As capabilities -- so he says and you don't seem to dispute -- aren't there yet (he emphasizes the "yet"), they belong in the "no" column. That they show great promise -- or even maybe contain the only solution to problems we haven't been able to tackle -- bears absolutely no relevance to the issue of whether they "have worked" or not. It is a statement of fact that they haven't yet, and you don't seem to dispute that. Similarly, putting something in the "no" column doesn't mean that something has lost. The author makes that abundantly clear. A no may well turn out to be a yes in time. A no simply means "not yet" (while "maybe" means that it may in fact be "working" now, we just don't have enough information to conclusively say). The article therefore voices no criticism on the validity of certain technologies at all. That, too, the author makes abundantly clear. It is nothing more than a list of those technologies that to this day have (or haven't yet) been conclusively proven to provide significant benefits and wide applicability in the field. Those that only show promise belong in the "no" category. It is an inventory, not a critique. You have no argument (so it seems) either with me or the author. In fact, I have no knowledge on this subject at all: I have no idea what capabilities are, I have never heard of Capsicum (or SELinux for that matter) and have never even worked on security related issue. it was just clear to me that you are responding to criticism that is simply not there, and responding with great force by dismissing the author (who is very well versed in technology), which is rarely a good idea, especially if you don't carefully read what he has to say.
- bascule 11y ago> Where does he say that? He says, "security still isn’t a first class concern for most programmers", and puts it in the "No" column. He put it in the "Maybe" column for 2015. Try searching for "Security" So Capsicum patches landed in the Linux kernel mainline, Kenton Varda is shipping Cap'n Proto and Sandstorm.io, and capabilities get a "no" but security gets a "maybe"? K. > I have no knowledge on this subject at all: I have no idea what capabilities are, I have never heard of Capsicum (or SELinux for that matter) and have never even worked on security related issue. Well that explains a lot...
- pron 11y agoYou still fail to say where you disagree with what the article says as opposed to disagreeing with what you think the article says. It's not a matter of knowing the subject matter but of text comprehension. Sorry, I missed the "maybe" on security, but he explains that "a handful of projects with very high real world impact get a lot of mileage out of security research". With all due respect to Cap'n Proto and Sandstorm.io, neither have "very high real world impact". If you think capabilities are widely used in production, in multiple domains, and have had a significant and conclusive contribution to the industry, then you'd be in disagreement with the author, and I'm sure he'd gladly change his description in light of the new information. Like I said, it's an inventory, not a critique.