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Related to this, the Debian nss package removed the SPI CA today, in version 2:3.21-1: https://lists.debian.org/debian-devel-changes/2015/11/msg02509.html http
by JoshTriplett 11y ago
Related to this, the Debian nss package removed the SPI CA today, in version 2:3.21-1:
https://lists.debian.org/debian-devel-changes/2015/11/msg02509.html https://lists.debian.org/debian-devel-changes/2015/11/msg025...
This has been planned for a while now. Between Let's Encrypt and StartCom, Debian and SPI don't need to run a CA anymore, especially not a CA that only Debian systems trust. Several Debian sites used to use SPI certificates, back when HTTPS seemed like an optional nicety. These days, every connection should use HTTPS, so Debian sites need to use certificates that all browsers trust, which they can easily do now.
SPI actually got an offer to cross-sign their root so that all browsers would trust it, but the consensus was that SPI didn't want to take on that risk given the availability of multiple other free CAs.
- azet 11y agoThanks for working on this! Post is also spot on. edit: Running a CA is a full-time job that requires financial backing, gear, well-trained operational staff and a lot of policies to operate in a reasonable and safe way. I'm happy that Let's Encrypt take their time to get everything in place and do not rush General Availability, BTW. I could not find /any/ information on SPI's CA on the web. I have no idea who or how they currently operate their CA. Their Website has a horrible and real-world vulnerable HTTPS set-up. I imagine their CA might also have aged a bit.
- neerdowell 11y agoWith the practicality of something that only worked on Debian systems aside... > Between Let's Encrypt and StartCom ... What do we have? StartCom doesn't allow their free certificates to be used for commercial purposes and will hold you to ransom if you need to revoke it (eg. after a major vulnerability which exposes private keys). Let's Encrypt only issue certificates that are valid for 90 days[0] because they want you to automate renewal by having your server automatically run their script which needs root privileges, and they use Google as the gatekeeper of who is allowed a certificate[1]. We are still short an option that issues certificates that are valid for 1+ years, which can be revoked at any time, can be used for any purpose and doesn't pass every request to a corporation for approval. [0] https://letsencrypt.org/2015/11/09/why-90-days.html https://letsencrypt.org/2015/11/09/why-90-days.html [1] https://letsencrypt.org/2015/10/29/phishing-and-malware.html https://letsencrypt.org/2015/10/29/phishing-and-malware.html
- hannob 11y agoI haven't yet had the need to try revocation, but Wosign is a more accessible option than startssl. No noncommercial restriction, 1 year free.
- thesimon 11y agoOne thing to look out for though is the fact that they offer you to generate a private key for you. You probably don't want them to have your private key :)
- hannob 11y agoYeah, a lot of CAs do this. I don't like it, I'd prefer a policy that forbids that. But as long as they don't force me to use that option I'm kinda okay with it.
- ymse 11y agoAs someone implementing the S3 API (on Ceph) for a non-profit, another missing option is wildcard certificates.
- JoshTriplett 11y ago> Let's Encrypt only issue certificates that are valid for 90 days[0] because they want you to automate renewal by having your server automatically run their script which needs root privileges That script is FOSS; you can see exactly what it wants to do. And it uses a documented protocol ("ACME"), so you can write and run your own script if you want, using several different ways to prove you control the server. The script provided by Let's Encrypt mostly serves as a proof of concept and a simple implementation for some common cases; various alternatives already exist that integrate will with various server software. > and they use Google as the gatekeeper of who is allowed a certificate[1]. > [1] https://letsencrypt.org/2015/10/29/phishing-and-malware.html https://letsencrypt.org/2015/10/29/phishing-and-malware.html I've never once seen a report of a site finding itself on that list without actually serving malware; I don't see any obvious basis for such a complaint. > doesn't pass every request to a corporation for approval. Let's Encrypt is run by "Internet Security Research Group (ISRG)"; quoting https://letsencrypt.org/isrg/ https://letsencrypt.org/isrg/ : "ISRG is a California public benefit corporation". And personally, since I don't particularly want to see any trusted CA run by only one person, just about any CA will be a corporation of some kind. "corporation" is not a dirty word.