4 ms·
Still seems to have plenty of vulnerabilities within a codebase that will never be updated anymore.
by mtgx 11y ago
Still seems to have plenty of vulnerabilities within a codebase that will never be updated anymore.
- ilurk 11y agoAnd it still seems to be the only solution to work cross platform, free, open source, that offers plausible deniability, and doesn't have any critical bug or backdoor. What would be nice would be for these researchers to publish those fixes. And let the unofficial forks (like Veracrypt) to incorporate them.
- dogma1138 11y agoResearchers can't necessarily actually publish "fixes", they might give some recommendations or suggestions how to mitigate it, but they might actually be unable to publish full code fixes because it's simply not their area of expertise. Bruce Schneier for example is some one who's able to design actual ciphers and cryptographic systems, but I'm not sure if he can actually "build" them as far as software systems go. From what I know of him, his works, and from reading his books he's a traditional computer scientists and much less of a developer, and I'm really not sure if he's up to date with the current C++ language standards and compiler architectures or insert what ever language you want here, in fact I would bet my money on the fact that he isn't but he's more than capable enough to find the right people to do that work for him. That said based on reading the audit report form the TC audit the findings are detailed enough so if you are capable of truly understanding them you should be capable of finding a way to resolve them, if not you shouldn't be developing cryptogrphic software in the first place.
- tormeh 11y agoNot for encrypting USB drives. If that's your use case then it's probably better than any unaudited software. I don't get this obsession with updates. If it's secure now for certain use cases then an update could only put that use case at risk. It's not like it can get "more secure" or something.
- stingraycharles 11y agoOf course it can. A system that was secure in 2005 doesnt necessarily have to be secure in 2015. With that in mind, it might be a good idea to slowly move away from TrueCrypt to a system that is equally secure but actually maintained.
- spacehome 11y ago> A system that was secure in 2005 doesnt necessarily have to be secure in 2015. Can you clarify what you mean by this? What sort of vulnerability could magically appear in Truecrypt to make it less secure now than a decade ago?
- dogma1138 11y agoTime, it's less about new vulnerabilities being introduced and more being discovered, some issues for example like identifying some statistical bias within say the software PNRG that could potentially be used to regenerate encryption key enmass more economically also only increase with time. That said considering the circumstances in which the "developer" of this software disappeared, how it was presented and the fact that it is not maintained anymore should make people think twice about using it.
- ChrisLomont 11y agoThe second paragraph of the article lists multiple new vulnerabilities found in Truecrypt just recently, some of which make the overall encryption weaker, others which allow attacking a mounted drive. An attacker knowing these flaws now has a smaller attack surface than a decade ago, since he now knows some weaknesses. There's the magic.
- liw 11y agoI don't use TrueCrypt myself, and haven't followed what's happening with it in any detail, but I'll comment on the general question here: why do you need to keep up to date with vulnerabilities in order to keep secure. First, nothing is ever totally secure. If a system gets audited today, the best the auditors can say is that to the best of their knowledge, the system has either no flaws, or list the vulnerabilities they know about. There might be vulnerabilities they missed. Some of the unknown ones might be blatant (say, a backdoor), or very subtle. When the unknown ones are found later on, and become public, the only way to not be vulnerable to those is to update. Second, a system may become vulnerable later by the environment around it changing. This might be, for example, a change in the compiler (you rebuild for a new platform, and the kernel introduces a vulnerability), or in the language interpreter, or some library that the software uses, or the operating system kernel, or something else. It might be that you upgrade the CPU and the hardware random number generater on the new CPU is worse than in the old CPU. It might be that you move your system from physical hardware you control to a virtual machine you rent, thereby violating security assumptions made by the software. A system, or software, that is never updated stays still, and never gets better, while potential attackers learn more tricks and more ways to attack. Sooner or later they'll find a way to attack any stale systems. And that is why updating is important for security.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]