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There were earlier reports of Soviet economic weakness that predate Reagan. As early as 1975, Senator Moynihan had predicted the demise of the USSR for economic

There were earlier reports of Soviet economic weakness that predate Reagan. As early as 1975, Senator Moynihan had predicted the demise of the USSR for economic and ethnic reasons. I think at best the policy accelerated the process. My view is that if the Soviet system was inherently inefficient, and it was, then it should eventually lead to collapse or reform if left to its own course. It didn't seem to necessitate such an wasteful expenditure that lead to a collapse that was terribly managed. It's not difficult to imagine worse scenarios where the Soviet nuclear arsenal played some role. That said, Reagan's original argument for increased spending was that the Soviet Union's military capability was relatively stronger.

akiselev 11y ago
This is exactly the feeling I get from all of my family's stories. There was an immense amount of inefficiency and outright fabrication (no pun intended) at every level of management beginning with Stalin's five year plans that only got worse in the three decades after World War II. The momentum generated by the existential threat of a full invasion was heavily bolstered by the availability of natural resources and a cultural emphasis on universal education which resulted in a lot of cutting edge military technology and scientific progress but by the mid 1970s the machine was running on fumes. By the time my grandparents left the aerospace industry (early 80s) it was a shell of its former self. Other than pioneering some stellar science using old but beefy rocket technology, it was incapable of developing anything groundbreaking new, especially given the gap in computer science and semiconductors that the Iron Curtain created in the 70s and 80s. The Buran project is a notable exception, but it was too little too late.
dalke 11y ago
"It's not difficult to imagine.." Certainly. The question is, is there any actual evidence? Quoting http://russianforces.org/podvig/2013/03/did_star_wars_help_end_the_col.shtml http://russianforces.org/podvig/2013/03/did_star_wars_help_e... , which examines the topic: > As could be expected, the data on the Soviet strategic programs in the 1980s clearly show that the U.S. policies and actions and its strategic buildup and the Strategic Defense Initiative program in particular, had a significant impact on the choices made by the Soviet leadership at that time. However, the nature of this influence, its mechanisms and the effect of the U.S. actions strongly indicates that these actions did not help bring the end of the Cold War. > The new evidence on the Soviet response to SDI largely corroborates the prevailing view that the Soviet Union eventually realized that this program does not present a danger to its security, for it could be relatively easily countered with simple and effective countermeasures. The evidence also helps answer some important questions about the concerns that the Soviet Union had about the U.S. program, the reasoning behind the choices that the Soviet leadership made, and the process that led to those choices. > ... > The issue of the Soviet own program that was produced in response to SDI brings a question of whether the burden that it imposed on the Soviet economy was a factor in the decision of the Soviet leadership to initiate reforms or even in accelerating the demise of the Soviet Union. The answer to this question is most certainly negative. While the package of anti-SDI programs was supposed to be a massive effort, comparable in scale to its U.S. counterpart, very few of these projects were actually new. The most expensive programs, such as the Moscow missile defense system or the "Energiya-Buran" heavy launcher, or the second-tier programs like the "Skif" space-based laser, existed long before SDI. When they became part of the "D-20" or "SK-1000" programs, they did not require any additional commitment of resources. Most of the projects included in the package never went beyond paper research and those that did were among the least expensive ones. Overall, while the military spending was certainly putting a heavy burden on the Soviet economy, there is no evidence that SDI or the Soviet response to it increased that burden in any substantial way.[89] Documents show that the issues of effectiveness of the military programs or shifting resources to the civilian sector had not became prominent in the internal discussions until about 1988, when the key decisions about SDI and the response programs had already been made.[90]
- TheCowboy 11y ago
  Sorry, I think I wasn't clear in what I was suggesting with the sentence: "It's not difficult to imagine worse scenarios where the Soviet nuclear arsenal played some role." I meant outcomes such as where a fringe general in the USSR felt it was a legitimate threat requiring a first strike, or an unmanaged collapse lead to dissemination and use of nuclear weapons. Basically, a successful policy can easily become a Pyrrhic victory. But this is interesting information, thanks for sharing it.

akiselev 11y ago

This is exactly the feeling I get from all of my family's stories. There was an immense amount of inefficiency and outright fabrication (no pun intended) at every level of management beginning with Stalin's five year plans that only got worse in the three decades after World War II. The momentum generated by the existential threat of a full invasion was heavily bolstered by the availability of natural resources and a cultural emphasis on universal education which resulted in a lot of cutting edge military technology and scientific progress but by the mid 1970s the machine was running on fumes. By the time my grandparents left the aerospace industry (early 80s) it was a shell of its former self. Other than pioneering some stellar science using old but beefy rocket technology, it was incapable of developing anything groundbreaking new, especially given the gap in computer science and semiconductors that the Iron Curtain created in the 70s and 80s. The Buran project is a notable exception, but it was too little too late.

dalke 11y ago

"It's not difficult to imagine.." Certainly. The question is, is there any actual evidence? Quoting http://russianforces.org/podvig/2013/03/did_star_wars_help_end_the_col.shtml http://russianforces.org/podvig/2013/03/did_star_wars_help_e... , which examines the topic: > As could be expected, the data on the Soviet strategic programs in the 1980s clearly show that the U.S. policies and actions and its strategic buildup and the Strategic Defense Initiative program in particular, had a significant impact on the choices made by the Soviet leadership at that time. However, the nature of this influence, its mechanisms and the effect of the U.S. actions strongly indicates that these actions did not help bring the end of the Cold War. > The new evidence on the Soviet response to SDI largely corroborates the prevailing view that the Soviet Union eventually realized that this program does not present a danger to its security, for it could be relatively easily countered with simple and effective countermeasures. The evidence also helps answer some important questions about the concerns that the Soviet Union had about the U.S. program, the reasoning behind the choices that the Soviet leadership made, and the process that led to those choices. > ... > The issue of the Soviet own program that was produced in response to SDI brings a question of whether the burden that it imposed on the Soviet economy was a factor in the decision of the Soviet leadership to initiate reforms or even in accelerating the demise of the Soviet Union. The answer to this question is most certainly negative. While the package of anti-SDI programs was supposed to be a massive effort, comparable in scale to its U.S. counterpart, very few of these projects were actually new. The most expensive programs, such as the Moscow missile defense system or the "Energiya-Buran" heavy launcher, or the second-tier programs like the "Skif" space-based laser, existed long before SDI. When they became part of the "D-20" or "SK-1000" programs, they did not require any additional commitment of resources. Most of the projects included in the package never went beyond paper research and those that did were among the least expensive ones. Overall, while the military spending was certainly putting a heavy burden on the Soviet economy, there is no evidence that SDI or the Soviet response to it increased that burden in any substantial way.[89] Documents show that the issues of effectiveness of the military programs or shifting resources to the civilian sector had not became prominent in the internal discussions until about 1988, when the key decisions about SDI and the response programs had already been made.[90]

TheCowboy 11y ago
Sorry, I think I wasn't clear in what I was suggesting with the sentence: "It's not difficult to imagine worse scenarios where the Soviet nuclear arsenal played some role." I meant outcomes such as where a fringe general in the USSR felt it was a legitimate threat requiring a first strike, or an unmanaged collapse lead to dissemination and use of nuclear weapons. Basically, a successful policy can easily become a Pyrrhic victory. But this is interesting information, thanks for sharing it.