4 ms·

Of course, we now know that the Reagan Administration knew that the "Star Wars" anti-missile systems were not going to actually work. The goal was never for the

by Bud 11y ago

Of course, we now know that the Reagan Administration knew that the "Star Wars" anti-missile systems were not going to actually work. The goal was never for them to work as advertised. The goal was to convince the USSR that they would work, and force the USSR to spend huge amounts of money trying to keep up. And it worked.

akiselev 11y ago
Do you have any reading materials about the effects the SDI had on the Soviet aerospace program? The only citations I can find from a cursory search don't seem particularly reliable or authoritative in this matter (largely off hand comments by talking heads, even Carl Sagan). I hear this out economic strategy repeated often as a post-hoc justification but based on first hand accounts (my maternal grandparents met while working on the Sputnik rocket and my entire family lived through this period in the USSR as engineers), my understanding is that although some spending in defense/aerospace rose during that time, the writing was on the wall for the USSR and it's space program by the late 70s. According to my grandparents it was impossible to reconcile the propaganda with what they were experiencing as engineers actually working in aerospace/defense. Apart from the politically doomed Buran, there wasn't even any ambition to try and match the United States except for geopolitical posturing.
- TheCowboy 11y ago
  There were earlier reports of Soviet economic weakness that predate Reagan. As early as 1975, Senator Moynihan had predicted the demise of the USSR for economic and ethnic reasons. I think at best the policy accelerated the process. My view is that if the Soviet system was inherently inefficient, and it was, then it should eventually lead to collapse or reform if left to its own course. It didn't seem to necessitate such an wasteful expenditure that lead to a collapse that was terribly managed. It's not difficult to imagine worse scenarios where the Soviet nuclear arsenal played some role. That said, Reagan's original argument for increased spending was that the Soviet Union's military capability was relatively stronger.
  - akiselev 11y ago
    This is exactly the feeling I get from all of my family's stories. There was an immense amount of inefficiency and outright fabrication (no pun intended) at every level of management beginning with Stalin's five year plans that only got worse in the three decades after World War II. The momentum generated by the existential threat of a full invasion was heavily bolstered by the availability of natural resources and a cultural emphasis on universal education which resulted in a lot of cutting edge military technology and scientific progress but by the mid 1970s the machine was running on fumes. By the time my grandparents left the aerospace industry (early 80s) it was a shell of its former self. Other than pioneering some stellar science using old but beefy rocket technology, it was incapable of developing anything groundbreaking new, especially given the gap in computer science and semiconductors that the Iron Curtain created in the 70s and 80s. The Buran project is a notable exception, but it was too little too late.
  - dalke 11y ago
    "It's not difficult to imagine.." Certainly. The question is, is there any actual evidence? Quoting http://russianforces.org/podvig/2013/03/did_star_wars_help_end_the_col.shtml http://russianforces.org/podvig/2013/03/did_star_wars_help_e... , which examines the topic: > As could be expected, the data on the Soviet strategic programs in the 1980s clearly show that the U.S. policies and actions and its strategic buildup and the Strategic Defense Initiative program in particular, had a significant impact on the choices made by the Soviet leadership at that time. However, the nature of this influence, its mechanisms and the effect of the U.S. actions strongly indicates that these actions did not help bring the end of the Cold War. > The new evidence on the Soviet response to SDI largely corroborates the prevailing view that the Soviet Union eventually realized that this program does not present a danger to its security, for it could be relatively easily countered with simple and effective countermeasures. The evidence also helps answer some important questions about the concerns that the Soviet Union had about the U.S. program, the reasoning behind the choices that the Soviet leadership made, and the process that led to those choices. > ... > The issue of the Soviet own program that was produced in response to SDI brings a question of whether the burden that it imposed on the Soviet economy was a factor in the decision of the Soviet leadership to initiate reforms or even in accelerating the demise of the Soviet Union. The answer to this question is most certainly negative. While the package of anti-SDI programs was supposed to be a massive effort, comparable in scale to its U.S. counterpart, very few of these projects were actually new. The most expensive programs, such as the Moscow missile defense system or the "Energiya-Buran" heavy launcher, or the second-tier programs like the "Skif" space-based laser, existed long before SDI. When they became part of the "D-20" or "SK-1000" programs, they did not require any additional commitment of resources. Most of the projects included in the package never went beyond paper research and those that did were among the least expensive ones. Overall, while the military spending was certainly putting a heavy burden on the Soviet economy, there is no evidence that SDI or the Soviet response to it increased that burden in any substantial way.[89] Documents show that the issues of effectiveness of the military programs or shifting resources to the civilian sector had not became prominent in the internal discussions until about 1988, when the key decisions about SDI and the response programs had already been made.[90]
- mapt 11y ago
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polyus_(spacecraft) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polyus_(spacecraft)
  - akiselev 11y ago
    The Polyus is a great example of my point (and that Wikipedia page does not provide an abundance of references, although I enjoyed the Buran book). It was a failed mission whose expectations were drastically downgraded several times and launched seemingly for the sole purpose of posturing on the international stage. All of the primary technology like the Energia rockets were simply oversized versions of their predecessors like the Proton rocket, except designed in the mid 70s and cobbled together in the 80s.
    - bkirkby 11y ago
      but doesn't that show that russia used their limited resources to inefficiently respond to SDI, even if it's just for posture? "The 1983 announcement by the US of their SDI program prompted further political and financial support for the satellite interceptor program."
      - akiselev 11y ago
        Its extremely likely that the Soviet Union used far more resources to maintain control over the small republics and it's conventional military presence around the world than it did in tail end of the space race, the former two becoming even more expensive with the political uprisings and occupation of Afghanistan in the 80s. We're talking about 1-2 orders of magnitude here (no citations but the USSR was more populous than the United States so the numbers would be in the ballpark). You can argue that this is the final straw that broke the proverbial camel's back but there were many, much bigger straws that had already done so, it's just that camel took a while to collapse under its own momentum.
jahewson 11y ago
This is an oft repeated myth. The US was far, far ahead of the Russians already to the point where they stood no chance of catching up. What motivated Star Wars was that the US had been overestimating Russian capability since the 1960s by factors of 10-100, so by the mid-1980s they were actually worried about where they stood. Basically, the CIA had no idea what was going on, as evidenced by their complete shock at the collapse of the USSR. Reagan decided to spend a ton of money redressing an imbalance that never existed. Star Wars and less fictional technology such as the stealth bomber were so far ahead of what the Ruasians had that they actually risked destabilising MAD to the point where a Russian first strike could be a logical choice. So the decision was irrational unless the US thought the Russians were ahead of them.
HillRat 11y ago
Interestingly, that interpretation was originally a Soviet conspiracy theory that later became the post-Cold War narrative. Unfortunately, it's not true -- in fact, SDI was an idea that Reagan championed relentlessly, believed in completely, and thought could completely transform the arms race and lead to a total elimination of nuclear arms from the world. As for the Soviets, their scientific commissions on the project (e.g., the Velikhov Commission) downplayed the feasibility of SDI, and while the USSR did invest in some speculative technology projects and some rather more expensive silo-hardening programs, SDI had little direct effect on their spending. The primary effect of SDI, other than some useful technological advancements, was to make arms-reduction talks more complex as the U.S. was unwilling to walk away from SDI research and the Soviets saw it as a needless provocation.

by Bud 11y ago

akiselev 11y ago

Do you have any reading materials about the effects the SDI had on the Soviet aerospace program? The only citations I can find from a cursory search don't seem particularly reliable or authoritative in this matter (largely off hand comments by talking heads, even Carl Sagan). I hear this out economic strategy repeated often as a post-hoc justification but based on first hand accounts (my maternal grandparents met while working on the Sputnik rocket and my entire family lived through this period in the USSR as engineers), my understanding is that although some spending in defense/aerospace rose during that time, the writing was on the wall for the USSR and it's space program by the late 70s. According to my grandparents it was impossible to reconcile the propaganda with what they were experiencing as engineers actually working in aerospace/defense. Apart from the politically doomed Buran, there wasn't even any ambition to try and match the United States except for geopolitical posturing.

TheCowboy 11y ago
There were earlier reports of Soviet economic weakness that predate Reagan. As early as 1975, Senator Moynihan had predicted the demise of the USSR for economic and ethnic reasons. I think at best the policy accelerated the process. My view is that if the Soviet system was inherently inefficient, and it was, then it should eventually lead to collapse or reform if left to its own course. It didn't seem to necessitate such an wasteful expenditure that lead to a collapse that was terribly managed. It's not difficult to imagine worse scenarios where the Soviet nuclear arsenal played some role. That said, Reagan's original argument for increased spending was that the Soviet Union's military capability was relatively stronger.
- akiselev 11y ago
  This is exactly the feeling I get from all of my family's stories. There was an immense amount of inefficiency and outright fabrication (no pun intended) at every level of management beginning with Stalin's five year plans that only got worse in the three decades after World War II. The momentum generated by the existential threat of a full invasion was heavily bolstered by the availability of natural resources and a cultural emphasis on universal education which resulted in a lot of cutting edge military technology and scientific progress but by the mid 1970s the machine was running on fumes. By the time my grandparents left the aerospace industry (early 80s) it was a shell of its former self. Other than pioneering some stellar science using old but beefy rocket technology, it was incapable of developing anything groundbreaking new, especially given the gap in computer science and semiconductors that the Iron Curtain created in the 70s and 80s. The Buran project is a notable exception, but it was too little too late.
- dalke 11y ago
  "It's not difficult to imagine.." Certainly. The question is, is there any actual evidence? Quoting http://russianforces.org/podvig/2013/03/did_star_wars_help_end_the_col.shtml http://russianforces.org/podvig/2013/03/did_star_wars_help_e... , which examines the topic: > As could be expected, the data on the Soviet strategic programs in the 1980s clearly show that the U.S. policies and actions and its strategic buildup and the Strategic Defense Initiative program in particular, had a significant impact on the choices made by the Soviet leadership at that time. However, the nature of this influence, its mechanisms and the effect of the U.S. actions strongly indicates that these actions did not help bring the end of the Cold War. > The new evidence on the Soviet response to SDI largely corroborates the prevailing view that the Soviet Union eventually realized that this program does not present a danger to its security, for it could be relatively easily countered with simple and effective countermeasures. The evidence also helps answer some important questions about the concerns that the Soviet Union had about the U.S. program, the reasoning behind the choices that the Soviet leadership made, and the process that led to those choices. > ... > The issue of the Soviet own program that was produced in response to SDI brings a question of whether the burden that it imposed on the Soviet economy was a factor in the decision of the Soviet leadership to initiate reforms or even in accelerating the demise of the Soviet Union. The answer to this question is most certainly negative. While the package of anti-SDI programs was supposed to be a massive effort, comparable in scale to its U.S. counterpart, very few of these projects were actually new. The most expensive programs, such as the Moscow missile defense system or the "Energiya-Buran" heavy launcher, or the second-tier programs like the "Skif" space-based laser, existed long before SDI. When they became part of the "D-20" or "SK-1000" programs, they did not require any additional commitment of resources. Most of the projects included in the package never went beyond paper research and those that did were among the least expensive ones. Overall, while the military spending was certainly putting a heavy burden on the Soviet economy, there is no evidence that SDI or the Soviet response to it increased that burden in any substantial way.[89] Documents show that the issues of effectiveness of the military programs or shifting resources to the civilian sector had not became prominent in the internal discussions until about 1988, when the key decisions about SDI and the response programs had already been made.[90]
mapt 11y ago
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polyus_(spacecraft) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polyus_(spacecraft)
- akiselev 11y ago
  The Polyus is a great example of my point (and that Wikipedia page does not provide an abundance of references, although I enjoyed the Buran book). It was a failed mission whose expectations were drastically downgraded several times and launched seemingly for the sole purpose of posturing on the international stage. All of the primary technology like the Energia rockets were simply oversized versions of their predecessors like the Proton rocket, except designed in the mid 70s and cobbled together in the 80s.
  - bkirkby 11y ago
    but doesn't that show that russia used their limited resources to inefficiently respond to SDI, even if it's just for posture? "The 1983 announcement by the US of their SDI program prompted further political and financial support for the satellite interceptor program."
    - akiselev 11y ago
      Its extremely likely that the Soviet Union used far more resources to maintain control over the small republics and it's conventional military presence around the world than it did in tail end of the space race, the former two becoming even more expensive with the political uprisings and occupation of Afghanistan in the 80s. We're talking about 1-2 orders of magnitude here (no citations but the USSR was more populous than the United States so the numbers would be in the ballpark). You can argue that this is the final straw that broke the proverbial camel's back but there were many, much bigger straws that had already done so, it's just that camel took a while to collapse under its own momentum.

jahewson 11y ago

This is an oft repeated myth. The US was far, far ahead of the Russians already to the point where they stood no chance of catching up. What motivated Star Wars was that the US had been overestimating Russian capability since the 1960s by factors of 10-100, so by the mid-1980s they were actually worried about where they stood. Basically, the CIA had no idea what was going on, as evidenced by their complete shock at the collapse of the USSR. Reagan decided to spend a ton of money redressing an imbalance that never existed. Star Wars and less fictional technology such as the stealth bomber were so far ahead of what the Ruasians had that they actually risked destabilising MAD to the point where a Russian first strike could be a logical choice. So the decision was irrational unless the US thought the Russians were ahead of them.

HillRat 11y ago

Interestingly, that interpretation was originally a Soviet conspiracy theory that later became the post-Cold War narrative. Unfortunately, it's not true -- in fact, SDI was an idea that Reagan championed relentlessly, believed in completely, and thought could completely transform the arms race and lead to a total elimination of nuclear arms from the world. As for the Soviets, their scientific commissions on the project (e.g., the Velikhov Commission) downplayed the feasibility of SDI, and while the USSR did invest in some speculative technology projects and some rather more expensive silo-hardening programs, SDI had little direct effect on their spending. The primary effect of SDI, other than some useful technological advancements, was to make arms-reduction talks more complex as the U.S. was unwilling to walk away from SDI research and the Soviets saw it as a needless provocation.