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How can one even remotely think that an app like Telegram can be secure, as long we know the very platforms it's running on are hackable (there are more than en
by nnq 11y ago
How can one even remotely think that an app like Telegram can be secure, as long we know the very platforms it's running on are hackable (there are more than enough 0days on the market)?! Yeah, maybe it's expensive and a bit friendly-fire-ish to target platform holes on a large scale, but still...
My bet is that the real bad guys always use face2face when possible, and voice/video with codewords and visual cues when there's no other choice... and maybe an encripted sdcard carried by hand/mail when they really need to cary large volumes. They can't be stupid enough to use anything else for such high risk stuff!
I'd guess that the only people actually depending on good consumer-lever crypto are whistleblowers, anti-goverment protesters and individuals and companies that truly value their privacy for one reason or another! Are these the people we want to hurt here?!
- nickpsecurity 11y agoGlad at least one person mentions it albeit near the bottom of the comments. I've been telling them that since before the Snowden leaks. Nice summary of required assurance activities and areas where issues pop up: http://pastebin.com/y3PufJ0V http://pastebin.com/y3PufJ0V The one exception is Ottela's Tinfoil Chat. It needs a robust, low-level implementation instead of Python. Yet, he cleverly dodged much of the TCB problem by creatively applying what he learned from others plus input we gave him on Schneier's blog for high assurance security & general improvements. So, you can build on and use that* but the rest depend on what top-tier and organized crime can buy attacks for. Ridiculous.... * Again, without Python and with TCB enhancements. OpenBSD at the least for its lower 0-days.