3 ms·

No it isn't - if your app did not ask for say a permission to connect to Internet or get a list of apps - there is no way to do that using reflection or NDK or

No it isn't - if your app did not ask for say a permission to connect to Internet or get a list of apps - there is no way to do that using reflection or NDK or whatever.

millstone 11y ago
And on iOS, if your app does not receive permission to access your location or contacts or camera or Internet, there's no way to do that by using objc_msgSend or whatever. On both platforms, these security policies are enforced at the process boundary, not by the runtime.
btilly 11y ago
I don't know about the latest version of iOS, but your statement was certainly wrong just 2 years ago. See https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity13/sec13-paper_wang-updated-8-23-13.pdf https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurit... for details of how to write an app that bypasses App Store review but will have security holes that allow your app to access APIs at runtime with no notification that it was not supposed to have access to.
- blinkingled 11y ago
  Yes, that was exactly my point. People keep repeating the iOS security being fundamentally better marketing mantra but it has been ordinary although the closed system helps it somewhat and they did seem to get the fingerprint security right. And I was referring to Android's permissions model when I said no you can't bypass it.
  - millstone 11y ago
    You may think it's "marketing mantra" if you're unaware of the technical differences. But compare, say, Apple's Secure Enclave with Host Card Emulation. Apple's design is just more secure. http://www.tomshardware.com/news/host-card-emulation-secure-element,28804.html http://www.tomshardware.com/news/host-card-emulation-secure-... I certainly don't understand characterizing iOS's security model as "ordinary." For example, it encrypts using a separate coprocessor running an entirely separate OS, that is protected against even an iOS kernel exploit. That's definitely not an ordinary design!

No it isn't - if your app did not ask for say a permission to connect to Internet or get a list of apps - there is no way to do that using reflection or NDK or whatever.

millstone 11y ago

And on iOS, if your app does not receive permission to access your location or contacts or camera or Internet, there's no way to do that by using objc_msgSend or whatever. On both platforms, these security policies are enforced at the process boundary, not by the runtime.

btilly 11y ago

I don't know about the latest version of iOS, but your statement was certainly wrong just 2 years ago. See https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity13/sec13-paper_wang-updated-8-23-13.pdf https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurit... for details of how to write an app that bypasses App Store review but will have security holes that allow your app to access APIs at runtime with no notification that it was not supposed to have access to.

blinkingled 11y ago
Yes, that was exactly my point. People keep repeating the iOS security being fundamentally better marketing mantra but it has been ordinary although the closed system helps it somewhat and they did seem to get the fingerprint security right. And I was referring to Android's permissions model when I said no you can't bypass it.
- millstone 11y ago
  You may think it's "marketing mantra" if you're unaware of the technical differences. But compare, say, Apple's Secure Enclave with Host Card Emulation. Apple's design is just more secure. http://www.tomshardware.com/news/host-card-emulation-secure-element,28804.html http://www.tomshardware.com/news/host-card-emulation-secure-... I certainly don't understand characterizing iOS's security model as "ordinary." For example, it encrypts using a separate coprocessor running an entirely separate OS, that is protected against even an iOS kernel exploit. That's definitely not an ordinary design!