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I completely agree with the article. From what we can tell password strength meters mostly work, or at least work "well enough." Some users attempt to game the
by Someone1234 11y ago
I completely agree with the article. From what we can tell password strength meters mostly work, or at least work "well enough." Some users attempt to game the system and in doing so wind up with marginally more secure passwords.
We also found 2F easier to implement than even we expected. Google Authenticator uses something called "Time-based One-time Password Algorithm" or TOTP for short. Even ignoring all the open source code and libraries, it actually isn't really at all complicated to do yourself. The hardest part is generating the QR codes for Google Authenticator (which, yes, we did utilise a library for). Even the storage requirements are low.
Our current passwords rules are:
- Minimum 6 characters
- Maximum 256 characters (for DDoS protection reasons, long passwords cause a high CPU load on our micro-instances)
- We technically allow a "weak" password but bring up a pop-up (strongly discourage it).
- We do have password expiration (90 days) and history (3x) due to unavoidable organisational requirements
But overall we're pretty liberal. You can use sentence based passwords and typically they're marked as "secure" in the traffic light score system.
> Forget about the now famous XKCD strip that proves a long lowercase password is more secure than a short dollar-sign-riddled password.
Technically what it proves is that you can replace one character in a complex password with one word in a sentence based password and get similar (or better) levels of security, even if the attacker knows you utilise sentence based passwords.
For example, a En-US keyboard has approx. 100 characters on it. A child's dictionary has about 10,000 words in it. But in reality less than 1/2 of those keys are ever typed, and less than 1/16 of those words regularly used (plus you have predictable words like "The" "A" "I" "And" etc which have less security value).
So a good rule of thumb is: If you move from random character passwords to sentence based passwords, keep the letters in the former the same as the words in the latter (e.g. 6x characters = 6x words, 8x characters = 8x words, etc).
This gives you the best chance of remaining either as secure or MORE secure while moving to lower case sentence based passwords.
- vectorjohn 11y agoJust curious, but long passwords shouldn't in any way affect CPU load. After the first hash (of thousands?), it's just hashing a hash, which is always the same length unrelated to the original password length. Even though I can't think of a legitimate use for > 256 character passwords.
- Someone1234 11y agoCannot argue with that. It should be noted that 256 characters is our default across all inputs if no other maximum has been selected. We could trivially increase it on passwords, but as you said, 256 is already higher than 99% of people use for a password and not at all unreasonable. Allowing legitimately unlimited inputs could cause problems regardless of hashing, since our timeout (which is fairly long for other reasons) would ultimately be our only protection. But if there was a request/need/complaint we would just double it and day to day likely wouldn't notice a thing.
- phlo 11y ago> After the first hash, it's just hashing a hash The recommended password hashing functions (PBKDF2, bcrypt, scrypt) actually use the provided password in each iterated round of the algorithm. The DoS vector Someon1234 mentioned is real and has previously affected Django[0] (and, I believe, others). In order to prevent it, you should either limit the maximum password length (256 characters seems sensible, as does Django's choice of 4096) or hash the password (to a known length) before passing it to the KDF. [0] http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/09/long-passwords-are-good-but-too-much-length-can-be-bad-for-security/ http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/09/long-passwords-are-g...