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On one side I understand the need for good passwords given how bad websites are at keeping their clients data private, but fundamentally the problem is rather t
by cm2187 11y ago
On one side I understand the need for good passwords given how bad websites are at keeping their clients data private, but fundamentally the problem is rather that websites are leaking data, not that passwords are too weak.
How do we solve that problem?
- LukeB_UK 11y agoThe two aren't mutually exclusive. Teaching users to create better passwords as well as hardening systems and making them more difficult to hack are both beneficial.
- scrollaway 11y ago> How do we solve that problem? You don't solve it, but you mitigate it. 1. Decentralize authentication and get rid of passwords. Persona/BrowserID had the exact right idea in mind and .. well, whatever, it's gone now, and we're all pissed off; plenty was said about it. We need the concept back and we need it to be popular. 2. Stop gathering so much data. Stop keeping it for so long. If your client's data is sensitive, ask yourself - and your client - whether you should really be keeping it and how long should you be keeping it for. You're not Google, Facebook or anything close to them - the odds are you will not be able to do anything with "big data". Either make the data public in the first place (if it's appropriate for it to be public), or wipe it out if you don't need it. 3. Start treating security malpractice in large companies as seriously as we treat Food & Health standards. Leaking hundreds of thousands of passwords because you hashed them with md5 no salt is criminal. 4. Build a better framework for users to learn the basics of security. How it works, why it matters; the fundamentals necessary to figure things out on your own. Make them understand what they're giving up if they are not treating this seriously. Education, education, education.
- misthop 11y agoThe simple answer is that you don't. A bad actor with a success rate of >0% is successful. A website with a protection rate of <100% is a failure. The unbalanced economic underpinnings (cheap to attack, expensive to protect) along with the necessity for perfection in protection makes it virtually assured that _every_ system, in time, will be compromised. Certainly there are levels of loss - single user information, just usernames, entire user list with banking data, etc. There are ways to mitigate the amount lost, but generally the more secure the system is overall, the more hoops legitimate users must go through to use the system. Then it becomes an economic trade off between security strength and user loss due to onerous authentication requirements. Our society has, for now, chosen a model that is low barrier to entry, reasonably low cost, with some risk.